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1	
 Introduction: Buddhism and Western 
psychology and psychotherapy
[Klammertext]
The dialogue between East and West is one of the most significant 
events of our century. If, as Jung confidently asserted, the West should 
create its own Yoga in the centuries to come, it will not be on the 
foundations of Christianity alone, which was his contention, but rather 
on the new global foundations laid as a result of that dialogue between 
the two halves of planetary humankind. At any rate, it is important to 
understand that this dialogue is necessarily a personal matter, which 
occurs on the stage of each individual’s heart and mind. That means 
we—you and I—must initiate and nurture it. (Feuerstein, 1998, p. 
xxxii)
Why should the West foster the reception of an Eastern system as 
Buddhism?1  Why does it make sense to incorporate a system that is 
seemingly so unconnected with Western history, cultures, religions, and 
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societies, and many of their values? Critical minds may ask these and 
similar questions. In this project, I provide some answers from a 
psychological ethical perspective, which clarify why East-West dialogue 
may play an important role in the future of Western societies.
Buddhism can be considered a fruitful dialogue partner for current 
Western ideas about experience and behaviour, because it has proved to be 
effective as a psychological theory and practice since its intensified 
reception in the West in the twentieth century. From a psychological and 
psychotherapeutic perspective, there are recognisable advantages to be had 
from the integration of Buddhist thought and practice regarding questions of 
mental structures and qualities. Buddhist approaches to experience and 
behaviour are helpful within a psychological or psychotherapeutic 
framework for clarifying the factors of the individual’s development and 
potential, embedded in a bigger whole of cause and effect.
This way of approaching Buddhist psychology – by evaluating its 
effectiveness with Western psychological and psychotherapeutic means and 
integrating parts of the system of Buddhism into psychology and 
psychotherapy – is one example of how contemporary dialogues between 
Buddhism and psychology/psychotherapy manifest. I will also describe two 
other ways: one is to analyse parts of Buddhism as an indigenous 
psychology that can provide specific answers to questions with which 
psychology and psychotherapy are dealing; the other is to approach Western 
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psychology and psychotherapy (or, in a broader sense, Western science) 
from a Buddhist perspective and integrate findings about human experience 
and behaviour into the system of Buddhism.
One main discourse in contemporary religious studies, which is of 
special importance for the dialogue between Buddhism and Western 
approaches to experience and behaviour, addresses the construction of 
foreign religions through Western religious scholarship. The language we 
use and are used to when dealing with religions signifies a certain 
perspective of how religions are received as specific cultural phenomena. 
Over the last few decades religious studies’ research has especially focused 
on how the subject itself has formulated and to a large extent created its 
objects – that is, religions (Gladigow, 2005). These creations show 
culturally specific characteristics of how they describe and systematise 
foreign societal institutions as religions (Gladigow, 2001).
The creation ‘Buddh‑ism’ appeared in the seventeenth century. That 
Buddhism is primarily seen as a religion as distinct from other societal 
institutions is a particular Western creation, which never took place in the 
same way in Asian countries.2  In the seventeenth century four main 
religions were distinguished in the West: Christianity, Judaism, Islam (or 
variants of Mohammedism), and Paganism (or Idolatry). The making of 
other religions – Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, etc. – is marked by a 
successive replacement of the broader term Paganism with more specific 
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terms of describing the foreign approaches that were included under the 
headline of ‘Paganism’ (Lopez, 2005). The problem of compart-
mentalisation of foreign cultural and societal institutions is reductionism. 
Phenomena are shaped into a certain way of methodological thought 
connected with the history of the culture in which the compartments are 
constructed. When ‘Buddhism’ was created and analysed as a religion, it 
was constructed from a Western perspective and specifically distinguished 
from other societal institutions; in this connection, for example, science.
Considering current religious studies, I regard a signification for 
Buddhism as a ‘system’ as being most useful (Schumann, 2005), which may 
be clarified by specifying additions. In this work, Buddhism is explored 
from a psychological perspective. As this perspective, from an emic 
Buddhist point of view, is intertwined with ethics, I refer to ‘Buddhism as a 
psychological and ethical system’ (see especially Chapter 2). Seen in this 
way, Buddhism is a dialogue partner for current psychology and 
psychotherapy and may also be referred to as ‘Buddhist psycho-
logy’ (Gómez, 2004; Kalupahana, 1987).
The other dialogue partners within this work – psychology and 
psychotherapy – also face problems of how they developed as specific 
systems in Western societies in relation to foreign cultures. As a modern 
science, psychology has to a large extent constructed non-Western cultures 
from its Western psychological perspective — often based on political and 
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power interests, as took place in the same way in the creation of foreign 
religions (Guthrie, 1976/2004; Seeley, 2000/2006). Psychology is one of the 
last disciplines of the humanities and social sciences that slowly becomes a 
part of the postmodern movement and in many fields it still holds modern 
philosophy-of-science orientations very strongly. The psychological 
dialogical perspectives presented here are postmodern. The integration of 
Buddhism and to a large extent the dialogue itself would not work within a 
modernist scientific paradigm. In the system of Buddhism the stating of 
truths in a strictly discursive and dualistic way is a source of human 
suffering. The Western reception of Buddhist thought often agrees with 
critical postmodern approaches in psychology and psychotherapy, which are 
grounded in ethical questions and intercultural sensitivity, and actively 
strive after revealing the weaknesses of modern psychology by 
deconstructing modern myths and trying to correct the problems caused by 
them (Slunecko, 2008; Fox, Prilleltensky, & Austin, 2009).
The following articles in this cumulative thesis outline fundamentals 
within the three approaches of receiving Buddhism as a psychological 
system, and discuss the philosophical considerations that are briefly tackled 
in this introduction. The article The Western reception of Buddhism as a 
psychological and ethical system: developments, dialogues, and 
perspectives provides a concise overview of the current research within 
these three approaches, with a special focus on philosophy of science and 
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perspectives based on epistemological considerations. In connection with 
this introduction and the conclusion, it serves as an exploration of the 
research and practice field [the ‘Klammertext’], on which analyses in the 
following articles are grounded. Experiencing sati: a phenomenological 
survey of mindfulness in Buddhist psychology explores the concept of 
mindfulness from the perspective of Buddhist phenomenology. Mindfulness 
is the central Buddhist idea concerning the reception of Buddhist 
psychology in current psychotherapy. Bewusstsein und Beziehung im 
Mahāyāna-Buddhismus: Ein integrativ religionspsychologischer Ansatz 
tackles epistemological concepts, which directly and indirectly are present 
as soon as experience and behaviour are addressed from a Buddhist 
viewpoint. Thus, this piece is an example of approaching (Mahāyāna-)
Buddhism as an indigenous psychology. How critical terms in different 
systems – in this case, ‘intersubjectivity’ – can create spaces for dialogue is 
explored in Dimensions of intersubjectivity in Mahāyāna-Buddhism and 
relational psychoanalysis. Crucial points are the consideration of the 
cultural backgrounds, as well as the different connotations and utilisations 
of terms in distinct world views and languages. The dialogue between 
relational psychoanalysis and Buddhism is one example of how postmodern 
ideas, such as interdisciplinary work and epistemological humility, can 
manifest in practice, with contemporarily recognisable impacts on both 
dialogue partners.
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1 A general East-West distinction is problematic. ‘The West’ here refers to 
cultures and societies whose philosophy is based on ideas about human 
nature with origins in Western, especially Greek, philosophy. The way in 
which different ideas about the human predicament have shaped human 
minds, embedded in their specific cultural settings, is one of the main 
considerations for a comparison between Buddhist and Western cultures.
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2  For example, in approaches of the yoga tradition the Sanskrit term 
vidyā is used to describe certain ideas and their practical applications. These 
are usually still considered to be religious (and not scientific) from a 
Western perspective. Vidyā from the root vid (referring to inner knowledge) 
can be translated as ‘scholarship, knowledge, or science’; e.g., haṭha vidyā 
‘the science of hatha (yoga)’, or ātma vidyā ‘the science of the Self’. Hence, 
what is described as unscientific from a modern Western perspective, is 
specifically designated as scientific and based on empiricist knowledge in 
the traditional Indian context.
2	
 The Western reception of Buddhism as a 
psychological and ethical system: 
developments, dialogues, and perspectives
[Klammertext]
Virtbauer, Gerald. (forthcoming). The Western reception of Buddhism as a 
psychological and ethical system: developments, dialogues, and 
perspectives. Mental Health, Religion & Culture. doi: 
10.1080/13674676.2011.569928
Three dimensions of how Buddhism is received in the West as a 
psychological and ethical system are outlined, based on the 
connection between mental balance and ethical behaviour in the 
Buddhist system: Buddhism as an indigenous psychology; parts 
of the system of Buddhism integrated in Western psychotherapy; 
and new movements in Western Buddhism, which are in critical 
dialogue with scientific methodologies and findings. The article 
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tackles questions of how the reception and integration of 
Buddhism as a psychological ethical system might continue to 
have an impact on Western cultures and societies, especially 
regarding epistemological questions that underlie (post-)modern 
sciences. Buddhist phenomenological psychology is a tool for 
analysing scientific and social developments, referring to the 
Buddhist ethical notion of non-distinction between individual 
and collective wellbeing.
Keywords: Buddhism; psychology; psychotherapy; philosophy 
of science; epistemology; postmodernism
The history of Buddhism is a history of reception in different cultures and 
societies, with integration into already existing cultural prerequisites. The 
transference from India to China, for example, was accompanied by an 
incorporation of (and into) established Chinese religious and societal 
systems. In today’s Western societies there is a growing dialogue between 
Buddhism and science. Buddhism has become one of the most important 
dialogue partners particularly for Western psychotherapy.
Interest in Buddhist psychology in the United States, which is the main 
starting point for the contemporary dialogical developments in the Western 
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World, increased primarily after the World’s Parliament of Religions in 
Chicago 1893 (Coleman, 2001; Hughes Seager, 1995; Snodgrass, 2003). At 
this point, writer and publisher Paul Carus was attracted by presentations of 
Zen Patriarch Shaku Sōen (1906/2004). His foremost student, Suzuki 
Daisetsu Teitaro (usually known in the West as D.T. Suzuki), consequently 
moved to the United States to assist Carus in promoting and developing 
Buddhist thought in the West (Verhoeven, 1998).
One of Suzuki’s scholarly emphases was Buddhist psychology. He 
portrayed Zen Buddhism as a genuine Asian practice for revealing the full 
capacities of the human mind. He was interested in fostering a dialogue 
between Eastern and Western psychologies and influenced by religious 
psychological thinkers (such as William James). This dialogue led to 
cooperations with psychotherapists and psychoanalysts, followed by the first 
classic works in this field (with Carl Gustav Jung & Erich Fromm; Fromm, 
Suzuki, & Martino, 1960; Suzuki, 1964); and to the Zen boom in the 1960s 
(Fields, 1992).
Though many statements of these early beginnings have been widely 
criticised in recent years, the importance of the dialogue between Buddhism 
and psychology/psychotherapy is not now generally questioned, on the 
contrary it is growing and expanding. Critics mainly pointed to biases due to 
specific cultural interpretations of the dialogue partners. As a consequence 
of explorations of Buddhism and Western psychology/psychotherapy from 
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certain constructional viewpoints, interpretations tended to be orientalist or 
occidentalist respectively: Western psychological thinkers analysed 
Buddhism through the eye of Western psychological/psychotherapeutic 
methodology; Asian scholars, like D.T. Suzuki, drew East-West distinctions 
that were highly influenced by a certain Asian cultural and religious 
background (Sharf, 1995; Snodgrass, 2003). Therefore, the early dialogical 
works in this field are marked by reductionism and misunderstandings.
The situation today is different, as Buddhism has become the subject of 
more intense and interdisciplinary study and research (in both Asian and 
Western countries) and an integrated part of Western cultures itself. Western 
adaptations and innovations are often informed by scientific ideas. Studies 
in Buddhism in the West nowadays are based on textual sources and 
Buddhist teachings in their specific cultural contexts and original languages. 
Yet there are also attempts to create a new Western Buddhism centred on 
basic Buddhist teachings, which can provide answers to the pressing 
contemporary problems of a globalised world (Ivy, 2005).
Three main current approaches regarding the relation between 
psychology/psychotherapy and Buddhism can be observed and worked with 
in practice: Buddhism as an indigenous psychology; parts of the system of 
Buddhism integrated in Western psychotherapy; and new movements in 
Western Buddhism, which are in critical dialogue with scientific 
methodologies and findings. As psychology and psychotherapy are highly 
Buddhism as a Psychological System
17
informed by different scientific disciplines, the dialogue needs to be placed 
in a broad network of scientific influences and analysed as underlain by 
contemporary Western philosophy(-of-science) streams, which most 
importantly shape psychological methodologies and findings and provide 
the background for innovations in the dialogues with Asian religious 
psychological thought and practice. The following exploration of the three 
approaches places the Western reception of Buddhism as a psychological 
and ethical system within this wider cultural and societal context, in which 
psychological and psychotherapeutic theory and practice are embedded.
Buddhism as an indigenous psychology
The term ‘‘Buddhism’’, like other Asian ‑isms (Hinduism, Jainism, etc.), is a 
Western construct. It can be traced back to the beginnings of systematic 
religious studies, when the Western Christian religious world began to 
superimpose more specific descriptions onto foreign (from that point of 
view, paganish) systems, which addressed the human predicament within 
the cosmos. That Buddhism is now mainly named and analysed as a (world) 
religion – and in this way distinguished from other cultural and societal 
institutions – is the result of these early constructions and developments 
within Western culture (e.g., Gladigow, 2001, 2005; Lopez, 2005).
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A skilful way for solving nomenclatural issues is the designation of 
Buddhism as a ‘‘system’’ (Schumann, 2005). Within this system many 
‘‘compartments’’ or ‘‘sub-systems’’, can be observed and analysed (e.g., 
religious, psychological, philosophical, ethical) without the need to fit the 
whole system into one specific sphere from a certain cultural perspective, 
which, in fact, describes how the receiving (Western) culture tries to 
understand the foreign system and not the received foreign system itself. 
This postmodern, deconstructive approach is the starting point for 
interdisciplinary work beyond the borders of, from a Western perspective, 
often clearly distinguished societal institutions, such as religion and science.
If Buddhism is analysed as a system, the second question is what, within 
this system, might be called psychological, or Buddhist psychology. Does 
the Buddhist system have an indigenous approach to human experience and 
behaviour and can Buddhist ideas about experience and behaviour be 
paralleled with Western psychology, and called a psychology? These 
questions were analysed in early translations of Buddhist literature. Western 
psychological terminology was utilised to tackle certain concepts in 
Buddhist languages. The direct connection and dependency between 
psychological method and Buddhist practice are implied by titles of 
Buddhist translations: for example, Rhys Davids (1900/2004) depicts the 
Dhammasaṅgaṇi (Pāli, ‘‘Enumeration of Phenomena’’, the first book of the 
Abhidhammapiṭaka1) as ‘‘A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics’’; 
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Anacker (2005) calls the Yogācāra2 philosopher Vasubandhu a ‘‘Buddhist 
Psychological Doctor’’.
Within the system of Buddhism, it is often difficult to draw clear lines 
between, for example, ‘‘religious’’ parts – such as worship, rituals and other 
daily structures in Buddhist monastic settings – and ‘‘psychological’’ parts – 
such as meditation practice in all its variants, as well as the teacher-student 
relationship and the direct transmission of insight and knowledge. 
Considering the definition of modern psychology as ‘‘the study of the 
nature, functions, and phenomena of behaviour and mental 
experience’’ (Colman, 2009, p. 619), Buddhism provides psychological 
methods of analysing human experience and inquiring into the potential and 
capacities of the human mind. Many Buddhist scriptures are kinds of 
psychological instruction manuals, which point to the practical realisation of 
their contents.
The characteristic method of approaching Buddhist indigenous 
psychology is hermeneutical work with primary sources and interpretations 
from a psychological perspective (e.g., De Silva, 2005; Kalupahana, 1987; 
Komito, 1987). The main assumption of Buddhist psychology is its strict 
phenomenological approach to nature, and, hence, the human predicament 
as a part of nature. The indivisibility of ethics and psychological wellbeing 
and, consequently, the connection between collective and individual are 
based on this phenomenology (see Ghose, 2007).
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From the Buddhist viewpoint, there cannot be an inner stable core, like a 
Self or soul (Sanskrit ātman), which underlies human experience and 
behaviour, as all phenomena (dharmas) are transient and dependent on 
impulses from other phenomena. Human experience and behaviour are 
based on cause-and-effect principles and analysed within a network of 
causation (Virtbauer, 2010a). Thus, a human being is a specific 
accumulation of phenomena and in interdependent connection with all other 
sentient beings, or, in a broader sense, with being itself. Each phenomenon 
can only be understood within its relation to other phenomena. For example, 
Dōgen (1200–1253) describes this phenomenal connection from an emic 
Mahayana Buddhist perspective:
Whether you speak of ‘living beings,’ ‘sentient beings,’ ‘all classes of 
living things,’ or ‘all varieties of living beings,’ it makes no difference. 
The words entire being [shitsuu] mean both sentient beings and all 
beings. In other words, entire being is the Buddha-nature: I call the 
whole integral entity of entire being ‘sentient beings.’ Just as the very 
time when things are thus, both inside and outside of sentient beings 
are, as such, the entire being of the Buddha-nature (from Busshō 
(Japanese, ‘‘Buddha-nature’’); trans. Waddell & Abe, 2002, pp. 60–
61).
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All experience and behaviour of a certain individual, as a part of entire 
being – that is, Buddha-nature – refers to and is informed by everything else 
in an interdependent phenomenal relation.
In the Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha (abbr. Abhidh-s) – the main concise 
‘‘textbook’’ of Pāli Abhidhamma psychology,3 and another textual example 
for the connection between psychology and ethics in Buddhism – the 
relation between states of consciousness (Pāli cittas), mental factors 
(cetasikas) that accompany consciousness and the ethical value of the 
factors is indivisibly interwoven. A psychological quality in experience is 
always connected with an ethical value, on which the state of consciousness 
in this moment is based. For example, greed (lobha), as an unwholesome 
factor, accompanies greed-rooted cittas, whereas wisdom (pañña) or non-
delusion (amoha), as a wholesome factor, manifests in cittas that are 
associated with wholesome qualities, deeper meditational states, insight and 
concentration (see translation and discussion of Abhidh-s I, II in Bodhi, 
2007, pp. 23–113, and discussion in Kashyap, 2006).
Buddhism, analysed as an indigenous psychology with Western 
psychological terminology, always needs to be tackled as a psychological 
and ethical system. This perspective is of special interest as soon as 
Buddhism is engaged in dialogue with streams of Western psychology and 
psychotherapy, in which the connection between psychology and ethics is 
not considered a given reality in the same way.
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Buddhist psychology integrated in Western psychotherapy
In recent years, the integration of Buddhist theories of the mind and 
practical techniques has been a flourishing innovation particularly in newer 
psychotherapeutic approaches (Heidenreich & Michalak, 2004; Wallace & 
Shapiro, 2006). The second approach in the reception of Buddhism as a 
psychological ethical system is the integration of parts of Buddhist 
teachings into already existing psychological or psychotherapeutic lines of 
thought. The most significant current scientific endeavours within Western 
approaches to experience and behaviour, regarding the dialogue with 
Buddhism, are the integration of theories and techniques from the Buddhist 
system into postmodern psychoanalysis and behaviour therapy. These 
developments are innovative and radical, insofar as both classical 
psychoanalysis and especially behavioural approaches within psychotherapy 
were firmly grounded on a modern scientific worldview that was opposed to 
the possibility of integration of (from this Western scientific perspective) 
unscientific speculative religious ideas about the human body, mind, and 
consciousness.
The psychotherapeutic approaches in the dialogue between Buddhism 
and psychotherapy are underpinned by a postmodern philosophy of science. 
The development from modernity to postmodernity in psychology and 
psychotherapy can, for example, be clearly recognised in the development 
from Freudian to contemporary (relational) psychoanalysis. The concept of 
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science, from a postmodern viewpoint, is characterised by non-dogmatism 
and interdisciplinary work. As one of the most important innovators in 
psychoanalysis in the late twentieth century, Mitchell (1993), points out: 
‘‘… all knowledge, including scientific knowledge, is regarded as 
perspectival, not incremental; constructed, not discovered; inevitably rooted 
in a particular historical and cultural setting, not singular and additive; 
thoroughly contextual, not universal and absolute’’ (p. 20). In this sense, 
interdisciplinary and intercultural work, as in the dialogue with Buddhism, 
is helpful in de- and reconstructing psychological theoretical frameworks 
and understandings of certain psychological fundamentals.
A critical term, both in relational psychoanalytical streams and 
Buddhism, is ‘‘intersubjectivity’’ (Virtbauer, 2010b), which is psycho-
analytically shaped within a circularly dialogical process, in which the 
circles and paradigms of acquiring knowledge are repeatedly passed through 
and relativised (Walach, 2005). The dialogue between postmodern 
psychoanalysis and Buddhist psychology can create new tools for 
expanding possibilities of addressing mind-states in a broader picture of 
cause and effect (Magid, 2002; Safran, 2003). In relational psychoanalysis, 
in contrast to classical psychoanalysis, the constituting components of the 
individual’s psyche (especially drives) are not analysed anymore as 
unchangeable somatic source energies. Their development is placed within 
an intersubjective matrix of relationships. Buddhism and postmodern 
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psychoanalysis can meet in their understanding of how relationships form 
the psychological possibilities of the individual. However, in Buddhism this 
psychology is placed within a phenomenological worldview, of which the 
components that constitute a human individual are parts (Bobrow, 2010; 
Epstein, 2007; Virtbauer, 2010b).
In current behavioural and cognitive theories and interventions, four 
main approaches need to be mentioned, which are either partly built on 
Buddhist ideas of awareness or show similarities with Buddhist ideas: 
Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR), Mindfulness-Based 
Cognitive Therapy for Depression (MBCT), Dialectical Behaviour Therapy 
(DBT), and Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT). All four 
approaches are described as ‘‘third wave’’ developments within behaviour 
therapy (Hayes, 2004).
Traditional Cognitive Behaviour Therapy (CBT, the ‘‘second wave’’ in 
behaviour therapy)4 is mainly concerned with the contents of the mind. The 
goal is to change thoughts in a way that they do not conflict with and are 
conducive to the client’s values and aims in life. Psychological health 
depends on how one is able to deal with and restructure the contents of the 
mind, which in turn changes, step by step, the perception and apperception 
of the person.
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‘‘Third wave’’ approaches, on the other hand, emphasise the relationship 
between the person and his/her feelings and thoughts. The healing process is 
based on the ability of the client to learn to become a neutral and mindful 
observer of thought processes without attempts to suppress or change them. 
Acceptance and mindfulness, the two critical terms in these approaches, 
refers to the detachment from any kind of habitual and automatic reactivity. 
A person should only actively engage in processes that are conducive to 
personal goals and wellbeing (Hayes, Follette, & Linehan, 2004; 
Heidenreich & Michalak, 2004).
Jon Kabat-Zinn’s work on mindfulness, which led to the ‘‘third-wave’’ 
approach MBSR (Kabat-Zinn, 1990, 1994; see Center for Mindfulness in 
Medicine, Health Care, and Society, 2011), is the basis for both MBCT and 
DBT. MBSR is a highly evaluated program, which is currently 
internationally established as an effective way for reducing stress by 
incorporating mindfulness into all activities in daily life, and, beside this 
basic focus, a therapy for illnesses and psychological disorders (e.g., 
Davidson et al., 2003; Miller, Fletcher, & Kabat-Zinn, 1995; Tacon, 
McComb, Caldera, & Randolph, 2003). The core MBSR program is an 
eight-week course that should enable participants to change their relation to 
their experience and behaviour and develop the necessary skills to progress 
further on their own. Although religious terminology is almost completely 
excluded from MBSR theory, the MBSR methods all relate to yogic 
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approaches to experience and behaviour. Beside the classical Buddhist 
background (Kabat-Zinn was himself a student of Korean Zen master Seung 
Sahn) of the MBSR methods of body scan and sitting and walking 
meditation, MBSR also includes hatha yoga practices.
MBCT by Segal, Williams, and Teasdale (2002) is an adaptation of 
MBSR to treat and prevent depression. It is based on the same ideas about 
the power of mindfulness as MBSR and includes elements from cognitive 
behaviour therapy. The effectiveness of MBCT has been proven in different 
settings, and it is currently used for a wide range of applications beyond its 
specific focus on the prevention of relapse of depression (e.g., Heidenreich, 
Tuin, Pflug, Michal, & Michalak, 2006; Williams, Duggan, Crane, & 
Fennell, 2006).
‘‘Technologies of acceptance’’ in DBT (Linehan, 1998) are partly drawn 
directly from Buddhist meditation techniques. Marsha Linehan has a close 
connection to Zen Buddhism and incorporates her understanding of 
acceptance in Zen meditation into the dialectical process of the therapy.5 
She refers to ‘‘radical acceptance’’ when describing an approach of 
welcoming even the most painful mind states without the need to react, or to 
change them. With the dialectical strategy DBT attempts to stabilise the 
relationship between therapist and client, reduce highly destructive 
behavioural patterns, and teach the client the necessary life skills to reach 
his/her goals. Linehan (1998) states four areas: skills in emotion regulation, 
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interpersonal effectiveness, distress tolerance, and mindfulness ‘‘that is, the 
ability to observe, describe, and participate in a manner that is 
nonjudgmental, effective, and experiential of the present moment’’ (p. 24).
A further highly evaluated and broadly used newer behavioural and 
cognitive intervention is ACT (spoken as one word), which does not have a 
direct connection to eastern philosophies (ACT is philosophically based on 
Relational Frame Theory (RFT); Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999; Hayes & 
Strosahl, 2004; see Association for Contextual Behavioural Science 
[ACBS], 2011). Regarding certain behavioural patterns, ACT arrives at 
comparable assumptions to Buddhist psychology. ACT is therefore one of 
the new therapies that are analysed in close relation to Buddhist practice and 
theory (Heidenreich & Michalak, 2004). Comparable to Buddhist 
mindfulness techniques, a nonjudgmental acceptance of all parts of the 
present experience – especially difficult thoughts connected with inner 
language – is emphasised. The intended shift is a focus away from inner 
conditioned language and behaviour shaped as a result of thoughts and 
feelings, to a commitment to following one’s own personal values, also (and 
in many situations especially) in opposition to inner thoughts and modes of 
reacting. Hence, the general emphasis in ACT is to learn not to habitually 
and automatically react, but to respond in ways that are conducive to 
achieving personal goals (Hayes, 2004). The aim of ACT is thus 
psychological flexibility, which should enable the client to reach his/her 
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personal goals in life and to act practically from deeply rooted personal 
values (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 2006).
An examination of the psychoanalytical as well as ‘‘third-wave’’ 
approaches, which are also referred to as the ‘‘spiritual turn’’ in behaviour 
therapy, from a religious studies’ perspective reveals a critical point 
regarding the contemporary developments: a historically critical exploration 
of how certain terminologies, techniques, and practices have developed 
within the Buddhist tradition itself is only partly included in this dialogue 
and current psychotherapeutic literature.
To broaden this dialogical endeavour, it will be necessary for more 
interdisciplinary collaboration to develop, as parts of the Buddhist system 
play a significant role in different contemporary Western approaches to 
experience and behaviour. As these parts can only be scientifically explored 
in depth when analysed within the whole Buddhist system, it is critical to 
understand their developments both out of the history of Buddhism and 
from a contemporary practical experiential perspective.
Comprehensive interdisciplinary research in how core concepts and 
practices, such as mindfulness (Pāli sati, Sanskrit smṛti), are presented in the 
scriptural Buddhist tradition compared to the Western received 
understanding of these concepts in psychology and psychotherapy is 
currently missing, but critical for a holistic understanding (see Christopher, 
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Charoensuk, Gilbert, Neary, & Pearce, 2009; Gómez, 2004). From this 
perspective, suggestions to take methods, such as acceptance and 
mindfulness, out of their religious and spiritual traditions and conceptualise 
and research them solely from a Western scientific point of view within 
psychology and psychotherapy (see Hayes, 2002; Kabat-Zinn, 2003) seem 
not to be feasible. Interdisciplinary research in this area ideally involves 
emic and etic Buddhist approaches — that is, conceptions within Buddhist 
traditions, and historical and comparative (meta) perspectives as in religious 
and Buddhist studies. If Buddhist psychological concepts and practices are 
to be integrated in Western psychology and psychotherapy an understanding 
of Buddhist ideas grounded on their developments within Buddhist 
traditions is crucial. Such an understanding reveals the connection between 
psychological states and ethical conduct in Buddhism, as shown in the first 
approach above.
Indigenous Buddhist psychology and newer streams in Western 
psychotherapy, which integrate Buddhist practices, share certain methods, 
but differ in their broader aims. While the goal of Buddhist psychology is 
enlightenment based on complete insight into human nature, Western 
psychotherapies are symptom-oriented and focus on acceptance and change 
of certain experiential and behavioural patterns. Psychotherapies do not 
address the complete change of the world- and self-view of the person in the 
same way, as it is implied by Buddhist psychology.
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Buddhist psychology and modern science: critical examination and 
integration
As in the case of ACT, science and Buddhism are currently meeting and 
informing each other in creating an expanded field for understanding reality 
and despite starting from different points, often arrive on common ground 
(Lopez, 2008; Wallace, 2007, 2009). In the ‘‘Mind and Life’’ conferences 
topics are addressed in a dialogue of scientists and Buddhist scholars and 
teachers, according to the principle of ‘‘building a scientific understanding 
of the mind to reduce suffering and promote well being’’ (Mind & Life 
Institute, 2011). That there is a profitable dialogue for both sides can, for 
example, be observed by the attitude of the Dalai Lama that Buddhism must 
be open to change, if there were scientific results that would imply a 
modification of certain Buddhist ideas.
A third approach of how Buddhism is received in the West as a 
psychological ethical system can be detected in these dialogues. Whereas in 
the second approach parts of Buddhism as a psychological system are 
integrated into Western psychological streams, this third approach 
conversely refers to modifications of Buddhist traditions in Western 
societies, based on the confrontation and dialogue with Western sciences.
The departure from parts of the Asian institutional background, such as in 
gender questions, is for some Buddhist traditions a necessary step in 
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integrating Buddhism into Western society; especially in the sense of an 
altruistic, socially, and politically active Buddhism that addresses global 
problems and engages in presenting solutions from a Buddhist perspective. 
This new engaged Buddhism (Brazier, 2001; Coleman, 2001; Ivy, 2005) is 
shaped out of a dialogue with the societal conditions Western Buddhists are 
living in, and, hence, especially highly informed and influenced by Western 
social and psychological theory (Queen, 2000a).
Movements in Western engaged Buddhism are intended to address 
current problems in the societal surroundings and the interdependent global 
connection of harmful developments. Areas such as prison work, end-of-life 
care, or environmental protection are dealt with from a Buddhist standpoint 
in dialogue and connection with science (Cohn Parkum & Stultz, 2000; 
Queen, 2000b; Rushton et al., 2009; Stanley, Loy, & Gyurme, 2009). 
Psychology and psychotherapy are Western systems that are most conducive 
to build a framework for dialogue with newer developments in Buddhism, 
because the Buddhist analysis of the human predicament starts with 
individual experience, which is seen as connected with all phenomena. But 
only the individual, him-/herself, can experience this non-distinction. The 
modern scientific definition of psychology, as a science of experience and 
behaviour (referring to individual development), is therefore a link to 
Buddhism as a psychological and ethical system.
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Recently, systems of Buddhist psychotherapy have also arisen, for 
instance, Brazier’s (1995) ‘‘Zen Therapy’’, which are integrations of 
Western psychotherapeutic psychological questions and problems. Newer 
developments in East-West psychology, such as ‘‘Zen Therapy’’ or 
Mikulas’s (1995, 2007) ‘‘Conjunctive Psychology’’, suggest that a merging 
of Buddhism and psychology may create new holistic ways of 
understanding the means and ends of Western science from a psychological 
perspective (see Watson, 2008). From a Buddhist point of view, the 
development of the human collective is not divided from individual 
consciousness, but intertwined in an interdependent connection.
What does this mean for the dialogue between science and Buddhism? 
Has science – or more precisely, the way that science creates our 
contemporary life world – changed, because of the reception of Buddhism 
in the West? The impact of Buddhism on modern science is still at an early 
stage because although there is interest in the Buddhist approach to nature 
the underlying epistemology of modern science has not yet been questioned 
in a way that might be possible in the dialogue with the Buddhist system; 
indeed, that might be necessary, if the system of Buddhism is understood in 
its entirety as a holistic approach to nature. Currently, Buddhism is often a 
new research object for Western sciences, which is examined with the same 
repertoire of methods and from the same scientific perspective as other 
objects. This enables the establishment of Buddhist ideas as, from a 
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scientific point of view, fruitful – as in the second approach above; and 
hence, the integration of Buddhist ideas into scientific approaches to human 
experience and behaviour.
As Loy (2003, 2008a) points out, social dukkha (Pāli, ‘‘suffering’’) is 
based on the same grounds (the three roots of evil (akusala-mula): greed 
(lobha), hate (dosa), and delusion (moha)) as individual dukkha. Given the 
non-division of collective and individual wellbeing in Buddhism (especially 
recognisable in the Bodhisattva-ideal of Mahayana Buddhism), suffering 
always needs to be addressed in a holistic approach to entire being (see 
Dōgen’s remark above). From this Buddhist perspective, Buddhism and 
modern science ideally share similar goals: Creating happiness by 
alleviating suffering through an increasingly refined understanding of how 
nature works (see Davidson & Harrington, 2002). From the Buddhist 
perspective, experiential interdependence of all phenomena is the soil from 
which such understanding can grow. Therefore, a dualistic subject-object 
distinction is an illusion, which becomes problematic, when it is taken as a 
dogmatic instrument for tackling reality. The subject-object problem is one 
main theme in postmodern philosophy of science as well, as it is the starting 
point for positivistic objectivity, which is questioned and, as in Buddhism, 
seen as an illusory approach to understanding reality in a deeper sense.
The German philosopher of science, Picht (1989), addressed the problem 
of subject-object distinction in modern science with his statement: ‘‘A 
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knowledge that reveals itself in destroying what it wants to know cannot be 
true (Eine Erkenntnis, die sich dadurch bezeugt, daß sie das, was erkannt 
werden soll, vernichtet, kann nicht wahr sein)’’ (p. 80). He argues that 
natural sciences that destroy their objects – in being divided from their 
objects, exactly by objectifying them – cannot be true. Even if they produce 
‘‘correct’’ results (Picht refers to Immanuel Kant), they are not ‘‘true’’, as 
long as the results destroy the basis on which they are grounded (i.e., in 
Picht’s work, natural sciences on nature). If natural science findings provide 
more and more means that destroy nature, the paradigm on which these 
findings are based is wrong, even if they, out of their specific scientific 
paradigm, describe mechanisms in nature correctly; and make these 
mechanisms practically useable, based on certain interests.
Feyerabend (1984) and, from a Buddhist perspective, Loy (2003, 2008b) 
propose as one important step concerning the question of how sciences 
function within Western societies, that there should be a focus on a mutually 
dialogical and democratic decision making process regarding scientific 
developments. This would help expand the field in which decisions that 
have national or global effects are made, and increase individual 
responsibility within collective decision-making structures.
From the Buddhist perspective, psychological ethics is based on a direct 
experience of interdependence. This realisation and the actual changes in 
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one’s behaviour, based on this realisation, are the keys for inner liberation, 
as well as for skilful changes of outer circumstances.
Notes
1. The Pāli canon comprises three parts, called the ‘‘three baskets’’ (Pāli 
tipiṭaka). The third part of the canon contains the ‘‘higher 
doctrine’’ (abhidhamma), which is a classification of Buddhist 
thought.
2. The Yogācāra (Sanskrit, ‘‘yoga practice’’) school emerged around the 
fourth century CE and is one of two main early Indian Mahāyāna-
Buddhist streams, the other being the Madhyamaka (‘‘middle 
school’’).
3. The Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha (Pāli, ‘‘a compendium of 
Abhidhamma’’) by Ācariya Anuruddha (ca cent 11th CE) is a summary 
of the main ideas of the third part (the Abhidhamma piṭaka) of the Pāli 
canon. See note 1.
4. Behaviour therapy is the branch of modern psychotherapy that has 
developed with a strict scientific paradigm, based on 
neuropsychological findings and theories of learning and operant 
conditioning, among other scientific evaluated approaches within 
psychology (Yates, 1970). As cognitive approaches have gained 
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increasing importance in psychology since circa the 1970s, also 
behaviour therapy has become a part of the cognitive movement, and 
partly departed from its behaviourist psychological roots. Hence, 
CBT is referred to as the ‘‘second wave’’.
5. Linehan (1993) developed DBT mainly to treat patients with 
borderline personality disorder (BPS). BPS is characterised by suicide 
attempts and a high suicide rate, and the difficulty to predict therapy 
outcomes (Gunderson, 1984). DBT addresses the difficulties therapists 
and clients face in the therapeutic process with a dialectical strategy. 
The aim is to change the client’s behaviour based on acceptance of the 
whole life situation and problems. The process is dialectical referring 
to ‘‘technologies of change’’ and ‘‘technologies of acceptance’’, and, 
hence, a middle way between these two seemingly contradictory 
strategies (Linehan, 1998).
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3	
 Experiencing sati: a phenomenological 
survey of mindfulness in Buddhist 
psychology
Virtbauer, G. (editor assignment completed, under review). Experiencing 
sati: a phenomenological survey of mindfulness in Buddhist psychology. 
Mindfulness.
‘Mindfulness’ (Pāli sati, Sanskrit smṛti) in Buddhist psychology 
and its reception in Western psychology and therapy have 
become widely researched subjects. However, there are hardly 
any accounts that focus on phenomenological qualities of 
mindfulness (sati) in Western psychological idiom. This article 
is a step towards filling this gap and addresses the experience of 
sati, based on Pāli Buddhist source texts, from a 
phenomenological psychological perspective. In this 
intercultural and interdisciplinary approach the first person 
experience of mindfulness in indigenous Buddhist psychology is 
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expounded in a way that is conducive to direct comparisons and 
dialogues within a Western psychological or therapeutic 
framework.
Keywords: Buddhism, sati, mindfulness, psychology, 
phenomenology, therapy.
Phenomenology can be briefly defined as ‘the study of the relationship 
between consciousness and its objects’ (A. Giorgi, 2006, p. 45). As such, it 
is ‘a method for knowing or investigating the way we know reality’ (Cox, 
2010, p. 25). The phenomenological method has developed in many 
directions and it is particularly fruitful in the research of religious 
experience (Sharma, 2001; Cox, 2010). Phenomenological psychology is a 
specific approach to human experience and behaviour that is based on the 
direct observation of experiential phenomena. Its results and consequent 
theories are entirely related to first-person experience. Phenomenological 
psychology focuses on the possibilities of realising the objects (phenomena) 
that manifest in one’s consciousness and on the analysis and description of 
the objects themselves.
Husserl (1913/1983) developed phenomenology as a descriptive and 
eidetic (Greek eidos, ‘form, appearance’) discipline. His basic assumption is 
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that humans can recognise the pure form of an experiential phenomenon. 
The way to arrive at the eidos – the true essence of a phenomenon – is 
characterised by the ability to be with a thing exactly as it manifests in 
experience, without any presuppositions. This means that an experiential 
phenomenon is put out of its natural environment and analysed without the 
direct connection to the conditions in which it evolved. Husserl refers to this 
procedure as the epochē (‘bracketing’). The transcendental idea of 
‘bracketing’ in Husserl’s work is philosophical. It is used in a modified way 
in the empirical methodology and applications of phenomenological 
psychology, which focuses on the appearances of phenomena within the 
lifeworlds of individuals. The cultural and societal settings in which an 
experiential phenomenon manifests are taken into account. However, the 
practical goal of phenomenological psychology’s methodology is to reduce 
the cultural, societal, and individual preconceptions that mould one’s 
conditioned experience to such an extent that the relation between these 
preconceptions and the nature of the phenomenon itself becomes clear 
(Ashworth, 1996). Reduction thus manifests in a contextual psychological 
sense and not in a fully transcendental epochē (Husserl, 1925/1977; B. 
Giorgi, 2006).
The psychological teachings of the Buddha, as preserved in the Pāli 
canon,1 appear to be the first fully developed phenomenological psychology 
in recorded and documented history. There are three main characteristics of 
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these teachings. They are (1) psychological in the sense of current 
psychology, as the Buddha was mainly concerned with individual 
experience and behaviour. The goal of his teachings is (2) therapeutic. He 
does not stop at a descriptive psychological analysis, but presents both a 
theory of how suffering (dukkha2) arises in human experience and a 
practical way that should lead to liberation from all suffering. The crucial 
means in this practice is ‘mindfulness’ (sati). The Buddha’s teachings are (3) 
phenomenological, as he is ultimately interested in the inherent nature of the 
phenomena that constitute human experience. In this sense, the Buddha 
meets with Husserl in the aim of finding the true forms of phenomena (in 
Husserlian terms their eide), though the historical and philosophical 
backgrounds, practical methods, and resulting theories are distinct.
The focus of this article is on phenomenological qualities of sati, mainly 
from the perspective of Pāli Buddhist psychology. It is the focus on first-
person perspectives of experience that underlies dialogical developments in 
postmodern discourses, particularly in the dialogue between Indian and 
Western psychology and therapy (see Rao, 2008; Pickering, 2006; Virtbauer, 
forthcoming). In Buddhist psychology, the direct experience of mindfulness 
is the key to a shift from an ego-centred way of experiencing to an 
understanding of the interdependent processes that constitute individual 
experience and behaviour. This shift completely reshapes the framework in 
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which individual experience takes place. From the Buddhist perspective, 
this is the way to the end of suffering in life.
Sati and Buddhist phenomenological psychology
Following a general principle that is also crucial in current therapeutic 
settings, the Buddha met and addressed people in their specific life 
situations and in a language they could comprehend. All Buddhist schools 
agree that there are two levels of statement. There are two truths discernible 
in the Buddha’s teachings—a relative truth (sammutisacca) expressed in 
everyday language and an ultimate truth (paramatthasacca) that describes 
processes at a phenomenological level in philosophical language (Warder, 
1980). Both methods of teaching are considered to be truths and the 
difference in quality must be understood in a contextual sense concerning 
different situations and audiences with certain needs. The characteristic of 
the teachings of the Abhidhammapiṭaka (‘The basket of the higher 
teaching’) is their focus on ultimately true phenomena (dhammas) 
(Nyanatiloka, 2008).
The books of the Abhidhammapiṭaka and its commentarial literature, 
particularly the Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha (Abhidh-s; Bodhi, 2007; Wijeratne 
& Gethin, 2002), are an important means to understand the place of sati in 
Buddhist phenomenological psychology, specifically from the viewpoint of 
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Theravāda Buddhism (Nyanaponika, 1998). There are four categories in 
which ultimately real phenomena (dhammas), which constitute human 
experience, are classified: consciousness (citta), mental factors (cetasika), 
matter (rūpa), and the awakened state (nibbāna) (Abhidh-s (1).2). 
Conditioned experience is based on phenomena (dhammas) that belong to 
the first three categories. Nibbāna is a state in which the human potential to 
step out of the conditioned cycle of experience is realised (Abhidh-s 6.62–
65).
From the Buddhist perspective as expounded in the Abhidhamma, a 
human being is an interdependent succession of certain conditioned physical 
and mental phenomena that can be categorised in consciousness (citta), 
mental factors (cetasikas), and matter (rūpa). Experience thus is a sequential 
stream of one state of consciousness after the other. It is based on cause and 
effect without an inner core or fixed guiding entity, such as a self or soul 
(attā). The belief of an individual in an inherent self independent of the 
cause-and-effect nexus can be explained through the subtlety of the 
sequence of consciousnesses, which appears to the non-awakened or 
cognitively untrained person as an inner, and maybe even unchangeable, 
identity. The task of Buddhist mindfulness practice is to train one’s mental 
capacity in a way that the subtle dimensions that constitute experience can 
be discerned with increasing clarity of their ultimate characteristics.
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Mindfulness (sati) is classified as a distinct mental factor (cetasika), and 
termed a universal beautiful mental factor (cetasika sobhanasādhāraṇa) 
(Abhidh-s 2.6). It is considered to be an ultimately real phenomenon 
(dhamma) that manifests in beautiful consciousness (sobhanacittāni) 
(Abhidh-s 1.14). Consciousness (citta) and its mental factors (cetasikas) are 
interdependent categories. From the Abhidhamma perspective, 
consciousness is the process of the cognition of a mental or physical object. 
This cognition always takes place accompanied by certain qualities of the 
mind3, which are determined by the mental factors. Hence, how an object is 
cognised – that is, the state of one’s consciousness at a certain moment – is 
directly related to the cetasikas (mental factors) that accompany this state. 
Consciousness and mental factors are themselves in interdependent relation 
to the physical aspects of being (rūpa).
The practice of sati directly relates to the cultivation of inner states that 
enable beautiful consciousness (sobhanacittāni) to manifest in the 
individual. Beautiful consciousness comprises all those states of 
consciousness that are themselves wholesome or the result of wholesome 
states of consciousness. This includes the states of supramundane 
consciousness (lokuttaracittāni), in which the awakened state (nibbāna) 
itself becomes the object of meditation. It also refers to the so-called 
functional (kriyā) consciousness of individuals who have realised the 
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awakened state (nibbāna) and all states of consciousness that are necessary 
to cultivate the potential to awakening (see Abhidh-s 1.14–43; Bodhi, 2007).
Sati is defined as a mindful recollection (anussati paṭissati). It is a quality 
that is necessary for clear remembrance (saraṇatā dhāraṇatā). Mindfulness 
is the opposite of superficiality and obliviousness (apilāpanatā 
asammussanatā) (Dhs 14). In the presence of mindfulness the complete 
mental immersion (ogāhanaṭṭhena) into the object of consciousness 
becomes possible (As 220–221, 253).
In terms of phenomenological psychology sati is a mental phenomenon 
that is crucial for the cultivation of states of consciousness that lead to 
increasing understanding of the processes of nature. From the perspective of 
Buddhist psychology it is the experiential insight into the nature of 
phenomena, physical and mental, which enables the individual to overcome 
suffering. Sati is necessary for the realisation of insight (vipassanā), which 
is based on a non-wavering consciousness that can immerse into its present 
object. It is a part of the awakened states of consciousness in which insight 
is accomplished and suffering is overcome. From the Buddhist perspective, 
personal well-being depends on the cultivation, direct experience, and 
application of this mental factor, which is the crucial tool for Buddhist 
meditation practice.
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Meditation and mindfulness
Two different approaches to meditation can be broadly distinguished in 
Buddhist traditions. One approach is a direct discernment of the 
interdependence of phenomena, which should qualify one’s self-experience 
and directly place it in the context of mutual causation. Another approach is 
a gradual training of the mind, where the constituents of suffering that 
generate a self-centred way of experiencing are identified. Sustained 
identification results in an increasing understanding of the characteristics of 
these constituents, which are without an inherent self-nature (attā) and in 
constant phenomenal interdependence. In both ways the goal is the same: 
complete liberation from suffering based on insight (vipassanā) into the 
nature of phenomena, which leads to wisdom (paññā) and awakening 
(bodhi), but the emphases in the meditation practices are different.
Right mindfulness (sammāsati) is the key Buddhist method for 
meditation practice, which is included in the four noble truths (ariyasacca) 
as the seventh method in the noble eightfold path (ariya aṭṭhaṅgika magga; 
see Dhammacakkappavattanasutta, SN Mahāvagga 12.1081; Bodhi 
1984/2006). The different understandings of mindfulness in Buddhism 
mirror the sudden (direct) and gradual ways of meditation. Dunne (2011) 
distinguishes ‘Innateist’ and ‘Constructivist’ approaches to mindfulness.
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Innateist, or sudden, approaches directly focus on the non-dual nature of 
subject and object. This direct focus on interdependence should enable the 
individual to drop conceptual understandings of him-/herself that stand 
against the reality of nature. A famous quote of the Japanese Zen master 
Dōgen Kigen (1200–1253) conveys the practical meaning of this 
suddenness:
To learn the Buddha Way is to learn one’s self. To learn one’s self is to 
forget one’s self. To forget one’s self is to be confirmed by all 
dharmas. To be confirmed by all dharmas is to cast off one’s body and 
mind and the bodies and minds of others as well. All trace of 
enlightenment disappears, and this traceless enlightenment continues 
without end. (from Genjōkoan (Japanese, ‘Manifesting Suchness’); 
Waddell & Abe, 2002, p. 41)
If one is able to completely ‘forget one’s self’, one directly realises the 
interdependent nature of being—one is ‘confirmed by all dharmas 
[phenomena]’. This direct approach to mindfulness in meditation, such as in 
the Sōtō-Zen practice of ‘just sitting’ (Japanese shikantaza; see Loori, 2002) 
or in the Tibetan Buddhist practices of the ‘great attitude’ (Sanskrit 
mahāmudrā) and the ‘great perfection’ (Sanskrit mahāsandhi; see Wallace 
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& Steele, 2000), asks the meditator to immediately let go of the very 
foundations of selfhood and to realise that a human being is a process of 
different phenomena without any constant self-existence—‘to cast off one’s 
body and mind and the bodies and minds of others as well’. From this 
perspective, everyone is in a deeper sense already enlightened—‘all trace of 
enlightenment disappears, and this traceless enlightenment continues 
without end’. It is a wrong focus in the experience of humans that prevents 
the direct realisation of interdependence. As soon as this focus shifts, 
suffering ends. Cook (2002) comments: ‘A Buddha is someone who is 
totally at one with his experience at every moment. This practice is simple, 
but difficult. And the difficulty lies in not adding something extra to the 
events of our life’ (pp. 10–11). In non-dual approaches to meditation the 
emphasis lies in a direct experience of this oneness: ‘We live an experience 
one-hundred percent, without adding any subjective judgment to it’ (Cook, 
2002, p. 9). The concept of mindfulness in Buddhist streams that emphasise 
direct, Innateist meditation practice ultimately refers to a non-judgemental 
and non-dual presence and not to the sustained concentration on an object of 
meditation (such as, for example, the breathing process). From this 
perspective of Buddhist practice, any duality between subject and object is a 
construct of the mind that is directly addressed and qualified (see Virtbauer, 
2010).
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Innateist, non-dual descriptions of mindfulness correspond to how the 
concept of mindfulness is primarily defined in Mindfulness-Based 
Interventions (MBIs) in Western psychology; ‘… as an openhearted, non-
judgmental, present-moment awareness, the direct, non-conceptual knowing 
of experience as it unfolds, in its arising, in its momentary lingering, and in 
its passing away’ (Kabat-Zinn, 2005, p. 128), or ‘… as a kind of 
nonelaborative, nonjudgmental, present-centered awareness in which each 
thought, feeling, or sensation that arises in the attentional field is 
acknowledged and accepted as it is’ (Bishop et al., 2004, p. 232).4 Kabat-
Zinn (2011), the originator of MBIs, developed a non-dual approach to 
mindfulness in Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR)—mainly 
informed by his Zen practice and Theravāda Buddhism, but also by other 
influences from Asian psychology, such as Hindu yoga and Advaita 
Vedānta. However, mindfulness in MBIs is usually defined operationally 
and contextually and involves adapted practices from both gradual and 
sudden Buddhist approaches (see Williams & Penman, 2011).
The gradual or Constructivist (Dunne, 2011) approach to the cultivation 
of mindfulness can be found in the treatises of the Pāli canon and in current 
interpretations of these teachings in different Buddhist traditions (see Bodhi, 
2011; Anālayo, 2003). Rapgay & Bystrisky (2009) refer to these methods 
that are conveyed by the Buddha in early canonical sources as ‘classical 
mindfulness’.
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The main Buddhist psychological treatise in the Pāli canon on ‘classical 
mindfulness’ is the Mahāsatipaṭṭhānasutta (‘The great discourse on the 
presence of sati (mindfulness)’5; DN Mahāvagga 96). In this sutta the 
Buddha describes a fourfold way of establishing mindfulness, which he 
considers the ‘direct way’ (ekāyana7) to overcome suffering: the 
contemplation (anupassanā) of body (kāya), feelings (vedanā), 
consciousness (citta), and the contemplation of how phenomena (dhammas) 
psychologically manifest in the individual. These four foundations of 
mindfulness (satipaṭṭhānas) are regarded as a direct way to realisation, 
because they enable a thorough analysis of all phenomena that constitute the 
experience of humans.8 The ability to directly observe how phenomena 
arise, how they are present for a certain moment in a unique constellation, 
and how they cease should enable the individual to develop a clear 
understanding of his/her personal way of experiencing and behaving. This 
ability can be systematically trained through mindfulness (see Wallace, 
2011; Sīlānanda, 1990).
The four satipaṭṭhānas (contemplations of body (kāyānupassanā), 
feelings (vedanānupassanā), consciousness (cittānupassanā), and specific 
psychological qualities (dhammānupassanā)) in the Mahāsatipaṭṭhānasutta 
provide thirteen meditation methods,9 which are tools for progressing on the 
path to a deeper understanding of causation. According to this sutta, the 
perfection of the practice of these meditations leads to nibbāna.10
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The contemplation of body (kāyānupassanā; DN Mahāvagga 9.374–379) 
includes six techniques: the cultivation of mindfulness in regard to (1) the 
breathing process (ānāpāna)—a thorough analysis of the in- and out-
breaths, the experience of the breath in the body, and the calming effect of 
the breath on the body; (2) the different postures of the body (iriyāpatha)—
walking, standing, sitting, and lying down; (3) the deliberate (sampajāna) 
observation of all activities in which one is engaged;11 (4) the anatomical 
parts of the body with attention (manasikāra) to their impurity (paṭikūla);12 
(5) the material elements (dhātus) that constitute the body—earth, water, 
fire, and air;13 (6) the different stages of decay of the body after death—in 
all ‘nine charnel ground’ (navasivathikā) reflections, which range from the 
observation of a corpse that has been dead for one to three days to the 
observation of the dusty remains of a skeleton that has completely 
disintegrated.
In (7) the contemplation of feelings (vedanānupassanā; DN Mahāvagga 
9.380) two aspects of mindfulness are emphasised. From the Buddhist 
perspective, as elaborated in the Mahāsatipaṭṭhānasutta, feelings are pleasant 
(sukha), unpleasant (dukkha), or neutral (adukkhamasukha). One should 
mindfully observe the quality of feelings as they arise, as they are present, 
and as they cease in one’s experience. The additional characteristics of the 
three qualities are their connections to sensual desires (sāmisa); or the 
freedom thereof (nirāmisa) – which refers to non-sensual feelings that arise 
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in meditation and are free from any desire or attachment. The task is to 
mindfully discern the six different states of feeling: the three qualities of 
feelings (pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral) combined with the two 
characteristics (sensual or non-sensual) of how these qualities can manifest.
Sixteen paired qualities, or states, of consciousness are described in (8) 
the contemplation of consciousness (cittānupassanā; DN Mahāvagga 
9.381). As in the contemplations of body and feelings, the task in the 
contemplation of the different states of consciousness is to be in the role of a 
detached observer of oneself, and to note which state of consciousness is 
present at the moment of observing. Six states of consciousness are 
connected with the unwholesome (akusala) and wholesome (kusala) roots 
(mūla) of mental occurrences. The mind can be affected by the 
unwholesome roots of greed (rāga), hate (dosa), or delusion (moha); or the 
opposite qualities can be present in the mind—the wholesome roots of non-
greed (virāga), non-hate (adosa), or non-delusion (amoha) (see Vism XIV 
162–163, 171, 143; Nyanaponika, 1986). The next two states are either an 
attentive (saṅkhitta) consciousness or a distracted (vikkhitta) consciousness. 
These four pairs, or eight states of consciousness, refer to ‘ordinary’ mind 
states, whereas the next eight states qualify ‘higher’ states of the mind (see 
Anālayo, 2003). These eight higher states are connected with absorptions 
(jhānas) and deeper experiences in meditation (see Gunaratana, 1985): the 
‘positive’ (in the sense that the higher quality is present in the mind) parts of 
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these four pairs are an expanded (mahaggata) consciousness that is 
developed through the meditative absorptions, an unsurpassable (anuttara) 
consciousness that has reached the highest level of meditation, a 
concentrated (samāhita) consciousness with deep meditative states of 
concentration, and the liberated (vimutta) consciousness of an enlightened 
person (arahant). The ‘negative’ parts are a not expanded (amahaggata) 
consciousness, a consciousness that still ‘has something above’ (that is, a 
‘surpassable’ (sa-uttara) consciousness that can be further trained through 
meditation), a not concentrated (asamāhita) consciousness that still can 
reach higher levels of concentration through meditation, and a 
consciousness that is not fully liberated (avimutta).
The last five ways of cultivating sati address specific phenomena and 
their psychological manifestations—the contemplation of dhammas 
(dhammānupassanā; DN Mahāvagga 9.382–403).14 The basic task of 
detached observation and noting is the same as in the contemplations of 
body, feelings, and consciousness. The mindfulness meditations in this last 
contemplation are concerned with an analysis of: (9) the five hindrances 
(nīvaraṇas) on the way to mental balance: sense desire (kāmacchanda), 
aversion (byāpāda), sloth and torpor (thinamiddha), agitation and worry 
(uddhaccakukkucca), and doubt (vicikicchā); (10) the arising and passing-
away of the five aggregates of clinging (upādānakkhandha): form (rūpa), 
feeling (vedanā), perception (saññā), mental formations (saṅkhārā), and 
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consciousness (viññāṇa);15 (11) the six internal (ajjhattika) and external 
(bāhira) sense spheres (āyatana): eye and visible object (cakkhu and rūpa), 
ear and sound (sota and sadda), nose and odour (ghāna and gandha), tongue 
and flavour (jivhā and rasa), body and tangible object (kāya and 
phoṭṭabbha), and thought and mental object (mano and dhamma);16 (12) the 
seven factors of wisdom, or awakening factors (bojjhaṅgas): mindfulness 
(sati), investigation (vicaya) of the ‘law of nature’ (dhamma), energy 
(viriya), joy (pīti), tranquillity (passaddhi), concentration (samādhi), and 
equanimity (upekkhā);17 and (13) the four noble truths (ariyasacca).
The Mahāsatipaṭṭhānasutta’s enormous importance for Buddhist 
psychology lies in its systematic description of all the ways in which 
mindfulness (sati) can be cultivated (see Kuan, 2008). It is the main manual 
for the cultivation of this mental factor. Whereas the direct way to liberation 
of the Mahāsatipaṭṭhānasutta implies a systematic training in all thirteen 
meditation methods, the meditation focus can also be on certain practices. 
The satipaṭṭhāna approach is flexible. One might focus on the development 
of all four satipaṭṭhānas as outlined in the sutta and practice all thirteen 
methods, or one might develop one of the four satipaṭṭhānas, for example, 
the contemplation of body (kāyānupassanā; see Kāyagatāsatisutta, MN 
Uparipaṇṇāsa 2.9), or one might only engage in a single meditation method, 
for example, meditation on the breathing process (see Ānāpānassatisutta, 
MN Uparipaṇṇāsa 2.8). Each satipaṭṭhāna, or a certain meditation method 
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alone, can indirectly generate all four satipaṭṭhānas and lead to liberation 
(see Anālayo, 2003; Nyanaponika, 1962).18
Rapgay & Bystrisky (2009) describe ‘classical mindfulness’, as it is 
expounded in the Mahāsatipaṭṭhānasutta, as the simultaneous practice of 
sustained bare attention and awareness. The distinction between attention 
and awareness is crucial for an understanding of the psychological 
mechanisms of ‘classical mindfulness’ in Pāli Buddhism. Attention 
(manasikāra) is a necessary component of all conscious perception and 
apperception. It builds the bridge between a physical or mental object and 
the mental state associated with the object.19 In the presence of mindfulness, 
attention can be developed to the level of ‘sustained bare attention’, which is 
the prolonged focused concentration on a consciously chosen object. In 
regard to the establishing of mindfulness (satipaṭṭhāna) in the 
Mahāsatipaṭṭhānasutta many objects that are described in the thirteen 
meditation methods are suitable to develop this bare one-pointed attention. 
Often the breath is chosen as the object of attention in meditation, because it 
is the most easily discernible and natural bodily process on which one can 
focus (see Ānāpānassatisutta, MN Uparipaṇṇāsa 2.8). Sustained bare 
attention should be developed to such a degree, that one is able to use the 
breath (or another object of meditation) as an anchor of concentration to 
which one can return willingly at any time. In this way, one can control the 
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thinking process and train the mind to consciously return to a one-pointed 
focus on a certain object.
In Pāli Buddhist psychology focused attention is necessary to broaden the 
field of awareness. If the mind is focused and attentive to a meditation 
object (such as the in- and out-breaths) one can at the same time develop 
deeper awareness of the physical and mental field in which experience takes 
place. Bare attention and open awareness are thus the means to analyse 
experiences of the body and mind as described in the Mahāsatipaṭṭhānasutta. 
Sati is a technique that enables one to be a detached observer of oneself 
through its two aspects of sustained attention to an object, which leads to 
one-pointed concentration (samatha or samādhi), and simultaneous open 
awareness of the arising, momentary presence, and passing-away of 
experiences. As soon as these two aspects of mindfulness are cultivated and 
naturally complement each other one automatically starts to analyse the 
causes and effects of certain states of body and mind. From the Buddhist 
perspective, this phenomenal analysis based on clear comprehension 
(sampajañña; cf. note 11) leads to insight (vipassanā).20
Insight enables the individual to let go of harmful and unskilful mental 
and bodily reactions and cultivate responses to mental and bodily events 
that are conducive to personal balance and well-being. From the Buddhist 
perspective, through insight into the nature of phenomena one stops 
identifying with the states of body and mind in a conditioned self-centred 
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way. Thus the ongoing mental recreation of a certain construction of one’s 
self-identity comes to an end and is replaced by psychological flexibility 
that is based on the ability to observe one’s mental life in a detached way. 
Hence, the cultivation of sati should lead to flexibility on a psychological 
level and to the realisation of phenomenal interdependence on an 
ontological level.
Experiential qualities of sati
The basic Buddhist notion of non-self (anattā) is important for an 
understanding of how sati is felt as a quality in one’s experience. Ultimately 
it is not an individual, in the sense of an ‘I’, that trains him-/herself to 
become more mindful, but mindfulness is an inherent human potential to 
fully develop the capacities for well-being and liberation. Sati is a part of a 
phenomenal process that manifests within or, in a wider sense, as the 
individual being who experiences it. The main concern in the Buddhist 
training of sati in both the gradual and sudden approaches to mindfulness 
meditation is a shift in the relationship to the constructed ‘I’. In the words of 
Zen scholar Sekida (1985) through meditation one aims ‘… to give 
existence its eye to see itself, to reconstruct the way of consciousness, 
emancipated from its delusive habit, and to let existential life start its proper 
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development’ (p. 119). The meditator steps out of the self-construction and 
becomes a spectator of it, rather than its fulfiller or victim.
Psychological flexibility as a result of mindfulness meditation is the 
opposite of craving (taṇhā), which is the root cause of suffering as described 
in the four noble truths (see Mahāsatipaṭṭhānasutta, DN Mahāvagga 9.400). 
In Pāli Buddhist psychology the result of craving is clinging (upādāna), 
which can psychologically be explained as conditioning (see Abhidh-s 7.7, 
8.4–13). Through the practice of mindfulness meditation it should become 
clear how the flow of one moment of consciousness after the other gets 
transformed through conditioned ways of relating to physical and mental 
objects. This relation is based on craving after phenomena in certain ways, 
which leads to clinging to specific ideas of how phenomena are to be 
perceived and apperceived. These ideas constitute an individual’s 
conditioned self-identity, which, from the Buddhist perspective, is a wrong 
view (diṭṭhi) based on delusion (moha) or on ignorance (avijjā) of the 
interdependent nature of phenomena (Abhidh-s 2.5, 20; see Bodhi 2007).
Sati should enable the individual to connect to a subtle dimension of 
consciousness that is usually hidden to the cognitively untrained by the 
process of conceptual proliferation (papañca; see Kuan, 2008). Conceptual 
proliferation refers to the framing of an experiential phenomenon into the 
perspective of the conditioned ‘I’. Thus in apperception a split occurs 
between the experiencer and the experienced. It is not the phenomenon itself 
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that is recognised, but the conceptually proliferated version of the 
phenomenon, which derives from the individually conditioned way of 
relating to the phenomenon. Mindfulness is the means to make the processes 
of perception and apperception clear; that is, both the phenomenon itself in 
its true interdependent form and the process of relating to the phenomenon 
and of transforming it in a way that it becomes a part of the individual’s 
conditioned worldview are recognised.
The question that arises here is why the practice of stepping out of the 
constructed ego and learning to watch the phenomenal mental processes of 
human nature without direct entanglement in them is connected with 
profound well-being and, in the final stage, liberation from all suffering. The 
crucial statement of the Mahāsatipaṭṭhānasutta’s refrain (see note 9) is that 
mindfulness leads to detachment. One stops to cling to anything in the 
world. Paradoxically, this non-clinging to anything in the world, which is 
based on the realisation that the human predicament is a part of phenomenal 
interdependent processes without an inherent self, enables the individual to 
fully engage in the world. It seems that the innermost human potential can 
only start to flourish if the main hindrance of habitual reactivity connected 
with a conditioned ‘I’-identity is overcome. This means that one’s own 
construction of reality is relativised and clearly seen as a construction. A 
person’s activities in daily life after the realisation of the processes of 
consciousness in this way might not change, but one becomes free from the 
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suffering that is caused by identification – in the sense of a fixed self-
identity – with these processes.
From the Buddhist psychological perspective, what sati practically does 
is to correct or re-align the relation to psychological processes in a way that 
this relation does not conflict with the ultimate interdependent 
characteristics of phenomena. The immediate result of this re-alignment is 
increasing mental and physical well-being, happiness, and balance. The 
explanation for these effects seems to be simple: sati is a means that allows 
natural processes to work undisturbed and these processes in their pure form 
do not cause mental suffering. At the same time sati heals the damages that 
are based on past disturbances. This healing is the result of growing 
understanding (vijjā), which itself is the consequence of one’s mindfulness 
meditation. Understanding enables one to modify behaviour that does not 
conform with the natural phenomenological processes that one has realised 
through the practice of mindfulness.
Another important aspect of the experience of sati refers to the notion of 
non-self (anattā). Because subject and object of experience are understood 
within the broader context of phenomenal interdependence, all individual 
experience and behaviour directly relates to the collective. Ethics in the 
system of Buddhism mirrors the understanding of one’s experience, which 
is a part of an interdependent process and does not belong to an isolated 
‘I’ (see Harvey, 2000). On a relational psychological level interdependence 
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manifests as intersubjectivity; that is, one recognises that within the cause-
and-effect nexus there are ultimately no boundaries between oneself and 
others (see Wallace, 2001; Virtbauer, 2010). In Western philosophical 
phenomenology intersubjectivity and empathy are crucial means of 
discerning the objective, and in this sense collective, characteristics of 
phenomena beyond individual perception (see Husserl, 1999). The unique 
feature of Buddhist phenomenology is its concept of interdependence. 
Physical and mental phenomena lack an inherent self-nature and have to be 
analysed in a network of causation. Sati is the practical tool that enables one 
to understand how phenomena interrelate.
The notion of conformity or inference (anvaya) is crucial for the 
understanding of causation in Buddhist phenomenological psychology. 
Inference in the context of the Buddha’s teachings suggests ‘… that the laws 
of nature, as we may call them, discovered by the Buddha … are always 
true. The inference follows that whoever, whenever, discovers them must 
find them to be the same’ (Warder, 1980, p. 117). This means that the 
Buddha’s teachings must be open to contemporary scientific inquiry and are 
not to be understood as a doctrine that is to be followed without direct 
proofs of the results of the practice in one’s experience. Thus beyond its 
reception and application in current psychology and psychotherapy the 
practice and experience of sati can play an important role within a 
continuous Enlightenment movement in the postmodern age.
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Notes
1. In this psychological article, Pāli canonical literature is treated in a 
traditional way as the body of scriptures of the Buddha’s teachings. 
For a critical philological account on Pāli canonical literature see, e.g., 
von Hinüber (1996/2000).
2. All Buddhist technical terms are in the Pāli language, if not otherwise 
stated.
3. Citta refers to the central mental and emotional faculty. In this article, 
depending on the context, it is rendered with ‘consciousness’ or 
‘mind’.
4. Cf. Kuan’s (2008, pp. 41–42) interpretation of ‘simple awareness’.
5. See Anālayo (2003) regarding translations of the term satipaṭṭhāna.
6. There are two Satipaṭṭhānasuttas in the Pāli canon—DN Mahāvagga 9 
and MN Mūlapaṇṇāsa 1.10. In the VRI-CS edition they are identical. 
In the Pali Text Society (PTS) edition the MN version has a shorter 
exposition of the four noble truths.
7. See Gethin (2001) regarding different renderings of ekāyana.
8. In the Abhidhamma the four satipaṭṭhānas are included in the 37 
requisites of awakening (bodhipakkhiya-dhammā), among which the 
mental factor (cetasika) mindfulness (sati) plays a central role 
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(Abhidh-s 7.30–41; see Bodhi, 2007; Gethin, 2001; Ledi Sayādaw, 
1977/2007).
9. The systematisation of thirteen meditation methods is based on 
recurring similar sections in the sutta after each of these methods; 
Anālayo (2003) calls these sections the ‘refrain’ of the 
Satipaṭṭhānasutta; Walshe (1995) refers to them as ‘insight[s]’. In 
these sections the Buddha recalls the processes and goals of the 
specific methods. The ‘refrain’ occurs thirteen times in the sutta after 
each of the thirteen specific methods of developing sati.
10. The Buddha states that the perfected practice of the four satipaṭṭhānas 
for seven days (though the number seven most likely has a more 
symbolic meaning here indicating completion and totality, as it occurs 
frequently in the Buddha’s discourses; see Anālayo, 2003) is enough 
to reach either ‘perfect insight in this present lifetime’ (diṭṭheva 
dhamme aññā; this refers to awakening) or the ‘condition of the non-
returner’ (anāgāmitā) (Mahāsatipaṭṭhānasutta, DN Mahāvagga 9.404). 
In Pāli literature, the non-returner (anāgāmin) is considered to be 
reborn in one of the highest heavens and to reach awakening there. 
He/she does not return to human existence.
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11. See Bodhi (2011) on the importance of the terms sampajāna and 
sampajañña (‘clear comprehension’) in connection with the Pāli 
canonical concept of sati.
12. This reflection on the impurity of different aspects of the body (31 
parts of the body are listed in the sutta here) is a means to detach from 
the self-identification with the transient aspects of the body (see Vism 
VIII 42–144).
13. These are the so-called four great essentials (mahābhūtas), which are 
considered to be the primary elements (dhātus) from which all 
material phenomena derive (see Abhidh-s 6.3).
14. The term dhamma in this context is difficult to render satisfactorily. 
Anālayo (2003) and Sīlānanda (2001) leave it untranslated. Anālayo 
(2003) gives the following description, which reveals the diversity of 
this term in Buddhist usage: ‘… contemplation of dhammas 
[dhammānupassanā] skilfully applies dhammas (classificatory 
categories) as taught in the Dhamma (the teaching of the Buddha) 
during contemplation in order to bring about an understanding of the 
dhamma (principle) of conditionality and lead to the realization of the 
highest of all dhammas (phenomena): Nibbāna’ (p. 186). Dhammas in 
the context of dhammānupassanā classify specific phenomena or 
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qualities, which are not tackled in the first three contemplations in this 
way, and their psychological manifestations in the individual.
15. In the Suttapiṭaka (‘The basket of the discourses’) the Buddha uses 
this categorisation of the groups in which phenomena that constitute a 
human being are analysed. The five aggregates correspond to the four 
ultimately real phenomena (dhammas) as described in the 
Abhidhamma (see above) in the following way: form (rūpa) is the 
same in both categorisations; feeling (vedanā), perception (saññā), 
and mental formations (saṅkhārā) correspond to the mental factors 
(cetasika); and viññāṇa is citta in the Abhidhamma classification 
(Bodhi, 2007).
16. One should observe the psychological connection between perception 
and the perceived and analyse how a fixed bondage (saṃyojana) – i.e., 
a habitual conditioned way of perceiving – between the two can arise, 
can be overcome, and can be prevented from arising in the future. In 
this way, perceptions within the six sense spheres (Buddhism includes 
thought (mano) – the thinking mind – as a sixth sense) should be 
‘freed’ from fixed connections to certain outcomes; e.g., the visual 
perception of an object and the following craving for the object should 
be clearly recognised as three interdependent phenomena: the object, 
the perception of the object through the eye, and the bondage 
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(craving) that can arise because of a certain conditioned way of 
relating to the object.
17. The awakening factors are opposites of the five hindrances mentioned 
above and develop naturally in a conditional order through the 
deepening of one’s practice, as soon as the first factor, mindfulness, is 
firmly established. Hence, in the establishment of mindfulness one 
should also analyse the quality of one’s mindfulness (sati) itself. From 
the Buddhist perspective, as soon as sati is firmly established, it will 
naturally lead to the other qualities that are necessary on the way to 
liberation (nibbāna).
18. An understanding of all other aspects of the four satipaṭṭhānas can 
(indirectly) arise, as soon as one satipaṭṭhāna, or even only one 
meditation method (such as the development of mindfulness of the 
breathing process), is completely mastered. The suitability of certain 
meditation methods or one specific meditation method depends on the 
present life situation of the aspirant.
19. Rewata Dhamma & Bodhi (in Bodhi, 2007) comment: ‘Attention is 
like the rudder of a ship, which directs it to its destination, or like a 
charioteer who sends the well-trained horses (i.e., the associated 
states) towards their destination (the object)’ (p. 81). In Buddhist 
psychology attention is one of the ethically variable universal factors 
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of consciousness. ‘These factors perform the most rudimentary and 
essential cognitive functions, without which consciousness of an 
object would be utterly impossible’ (p. 78; see Abhidh-s 2.2).
20. This interpretation stresses the importance of mindfulness for the 
development of both concentration and insight. In the Theravāda 
school, traditionally there is a preference to interpret mindfulness as 
the factor that leads to insight and awakening, whereas the 
development of concentration plays a less important role (see Kuan, 
2008).
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4	
 Bewusstsein und Beziehung im Mahāyāna-
Buddhismus. Ein integrativ 
religionspsychologischer Ansatz
Virtbauer, Gerald. (2011). Bewusstsein und Beziehung im Mahāyāna-
Buddhismus. Ein integrativ religionspsychologischer Ansatz. e-Journal 
Philosophie der Psychologie, 15. Retrieved from http://www.jp.philo.at/
texte/VirtbauerG2.pdf
One of the main Buddhist epistemological bases—
interdependence—is explored from a phenomenological 
psychological point of view, by focusing on human 
consciousness and the relational experience connected with 
psychological processes. Two crucial Mahāyāna teachings—the 
Laṅkāvatārasūtra and the metaphor of the net of Indra—serve 
as the grounds on which central psychological fundamentals of 
Mahāyāna-Buddhism are outlined. Through the phenomenolo-
gical method of working through the emic perspective of 
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treatises Buddhism is analysed from the non-distinction between 
teachings and personal experience, which is the characteristic of 
the Buddhist system.
Ein Grundkennzeichen des menschlichen Beziehungserlebens aus 
Mahāyāna-buddhistischer Sicht ist Interdependenz, die sich aus der Nicht-
Ich(Sanskrit anātman)-Lehre1 des Buddhismus ergibt. Im Buddhismus wird 
der Mensch in einem Feld von phänomenalen Beeinflussungen und 
Abhängigkeiten betrachtet, was zu einer Relativierung der individuell 
abgeschlossenen Person führt und sie selbst, als Person, aus einem größeren 
Kontext heraus erklärt. Die Erkenntnis dieses größeren Kontexts ist für das 
einzelne Individuum der entscheidende Schritt um das Leiden (duḥkha) im 
Leben zu überwinden. Dieses entsteht nach buddhistischer Anschauung 
durch die Folgen der bewussten Ausschließung der phänomenalen 
Beeinflussungen, da sich nur in deren Geflecht das individuelle Dasein 
verstehen lässt.
Anhand eines bedeutenden sūtras, das der Yogācāra-Philosophie 
zuzurechnen ist (Lusthaus & Muller, 2000; Schmithausen, 2007), sowie der 
Metapher des Netzes von Indra, zeige ich einige psychologische Punkte auf, 
die für das Verständnis von Darlegungen gegenwärtiger buddhistisch 
Lehrender und den Dialog mit westlich psychologischen und 
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psychotherapeutischen Zugängen entscheidend sind (siehe Jiang, 2006). 
Methodisch orientiere ich mich an den Vorgaben, die an eine postmoderne 
(in diesem Fall auf philosophisch religionspsychologische Aspekte 
ausgerichtete) Religionsphänomenologie gestellt werden (siehe Michaels, 
Pezzoli-Olgiati, & Stolz, 2001; Sharma, 2001).
Um zu verstehen, wie Aspekte von religiösen Systemen allgemein 
gegenwärtig im Dialog mit Wissenschaften Anwendung finden und, konkret 
in diesem Fall, worauf Rezeptionswege und formen des Buddhismus als 
psychologischem System im Westen im Dialog mit der Psychologie und 
Psychotherapie aufbauen (Wallace & Shapiro, 2006; Virtbauer 2008b), 
erscheint mir ein phänomenologisch ausgerichtetes Arbeiten sehr 
zweckdienlich. Zwei Punkte gilt es meines Erachtens dabei besonders zu 
beachten. Zum einen ist ein subjektiver Anteil, der auf die kulturelle und 
gesellschaftliche Einbettung, sowie persönliche Geschichte des Autors 
verweist, in einer religionswissenschaftlichen Hermeneutik ein integrierter 
Bestandteil (siehe z.B. Faure, 1998), der, positiv umgesetzt, wichtige 
weitere Anstöße zur Thematik und kritische Reflexionen fördern kann und 
soll. Zum anderen, und dieser Punkt ist die Folge des ersten, kommt dabei 
deutlich ein zirkulärer, kreishafter Prozess von Wissensgewinn zum 
Vorschein, wobei die Kreise des Verstehens und Erkennens immer wieder 
neu durchlaufen werden (Walach, 2005). In diesem Prozess ist 
religionsphänomenologisches Arbeiten, das in der Lage ist, gegenwärtig 
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gelebte religiöse Praxis mit geschichtlichen Grundlagen der Religion zu 
verknüpfen, von entscheidende Bedeutung (Waardenburg, 2001).
Bewusstsein im Buddhismus
In der Psychologie des Buddhismus2 spielt die Frage des Bewusstseins des 
Menschen eine herausragende Rolle. Die buddhistische Konzeption von 
Bewusstsein, auf die im Folgenden näher eingegangen wird, kennzeichnet 
das letzte der fünf Aggregate (skandhas), deren Zusammenspiel den 
Menschen als Individuum konstituieren.3 Bewusstsein (vijñāna) stellt 
traditionell ein sechsfaches Bewusstwerden von Sinneseindrücken dar: Seh-, 
Hör-, Geruchs-, Geschmacks-, Tastsinn, sowie geistige Vorgänge. Vijñāna 
kommt dabei eine ordnende und organisierende Rolle zu, die letztendlich 
den Menschen als in seiner Weise charakteristisches, erlebendes Wesen 
ausmacht. Mentale Denkvorgänge (als sechster Sinn) werden in gleicher 
Weise wie Sinneseindrücke behandelt. Als psychische Instanz verweisen sie 
auf die Geschichte des Individuums und liefern das Fundament für die 
Realisation des, dem Menschen innewohnenden, Potentials von Erkenntnis.
Das Laṅkāvatārasūtra und der menschliche Geist
Ein in Bezug auf dieses Potential sehr entscheidender indischer Mahāyāna-
Text, vor allem für die spätere Herausbildung des Chan(Chinesisch 
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‚Meditation‘, Japanisch Zen)-Buddhismus in China, ist das 
Laṅkāvatārasūtra.4 Die philosophische Psychologie dieses sūtras beschreibt 
den menschlichen Geist (Sanskrit citta) als Ausgangspunkt jeglicher 
Erfahrung. Der Geist spiegelt sowohl eine absolute Sichtweise, im Sinne 
einer Verbindung und Nichtunterscheidung sämtlicher Erfahrungen 
bewusstseinsfähiger Wesen, als auch eine relative, im Sinne des 
individuellen Geistes der einzelnen Person, wider. Die Problemsituation, in 
der sich der Mensch dabei befindet, ist gekennzeichnet durch die Tendenz, 
sich der verbindenden Erfahrung, die vom Individuum selbst erlebt werden 
kann, nicht zu öffnen und in einer Abgrenzung und Unterscheidung sein 
individuelles Selbst zu entwickeln und zu stärken. Nach Mahāyāna-
buddhistischer Anschauung ist es gerade diese Abgrenzung und scheinbare 
Stärkung und Versicherung, die Leiden (duḥkha) verursacht, da sie sich der 
natürlichen Voraussetzung des Menschen—der Verbindung und 
Nichtunterscheidung—gegenüberstellt und daher die, im Sinne des 
Mahāyāna, eigentliche Natur des Menschen (Buddha-Natur (buddhatā)), die 
nicht auf einer Selbst-Konstruktion beruht, in ihrer Entfaltung behindert. 
Die Paradoxie, mit der sich der Buddhismus in dieser Konzeption logisch 
sprachlich konfrontiert, ist die Schwierigkeit zu beschreiben, wie 
Nichtunterscheidung und Unterscheidung zur gleichen Zeit möglich ist, da 
einerseits das Streben und Ziel der menschlichen Natur auf 
Nichtunterscheidung ausgerichtet ist, andererseits die individuelle Person 
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sich nur unterscheidend als solche erfahren kann (Virtbauer, 2010). 
Nichtunterscheidung charakterisiert eine Erlebensqualität, in der die 
Verbindung jeglicher Phänomene hervortritt und das eigene Dasein als 
(abgegrenztes) Individuum relativiert wird.5
Letztendlich übersteigt die Erkenntnis dieser Verbindung jegliche 
sprachliche Ausdrucksform und verweist im Buddhismus auf praktisches 
Bemühen und durch die buddhistische (Meditations-)Praxis entwickelte 
Fähigkeiten des Erkennens. Im Zen-Buddhismus wird in der Vermittlung 
dieser Praxis betont, dass es sich wesenhaft um eine nicht diskursive, 
wortlose, nicht auf Schriften basierende Übermittlung (Japanisch furyū 
monji) handelt, die von Herz-Geist zu Herz-Geist (ishin denshin) geschieht. 
Autoren buddhistischer sutrās versuchen diese Paradoxie auch in 
sprachlichen Ausdrucksformen bis zu einem gewissen Grad zu lösen. Sūtras 
sind in diesem Sinne metaphorisch der Finger, der auf dem Mond zeigt, 
vermitteln jedoch nicht den letztendlichen Gehalt der Erfahrung—in diesem 
Gleichnis den Mond selbst (Fischer-Schreiber, Ehrhard, Friedrichs, & 
Diener, 1986/2001, S. 113; Golzio, 1995, S. 199, 227; Suzuki, 1930/1999, S. 
105ff.). Das Laṅkāvatārasūtra stellt aus psychologischer Sicht einen 
solchen Fingerzeig dar, wobei besonderer Wert auf das vijñāna gelegt wird. 
Dieses ‚Organ’ der Erkenntnis erfährt im Laṅkāvatārasūtra eine spezielle 
Ausgestaltung.
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Acht Vijñānas, Ālayavijñāna
Das Laṅkāvatārasūtra unterscheidet insgesamt acht vijñānas. Die 
Einteilung in sechs vijñānas weicht einer Anordnung in fünf Sinnen-
vijñānas, monovijñāna, manas-vijñāna, und ālayavijñāna.
Das ālayavijñāna ist direkt auf die Wahrnehmung gerichtet. Es kann als 
großer Speicher gedacht werden, der neben allen persönlichen Eindrücken 
des Individuums, auch auf das citta (den Geist) in seiner absoluten Form 
verweist. Der ālaya (Sanskrit ‚Wohnung, Haus‘) trägt in sich alle Eindrücke, 
die das Individuum in seiner Geschichte gesammelt hat und die seine 
Bewusstseinsfähigkeit durch die Kette von Ursache und Wirkung in der 
Gegenwart ausmachen, zugleich aber auch den diese Verursachungskette 
tragenden absoluten Geist (citta), der als alle bewusstseinsfähige Wesen 
verbindender Grund nicht denkbar ist, sondern nur durch die durch ihn 
hervorgebrachten geistigen Phänomene in deren Ausformung erlebbar wird, 
was wiederum auf den relativen, dem Individuum zugehörigen Geist 
verweist (Waldron, 2003).
Der ālaya ist daher das ‚Haus‘  sämtlicher Faktoren (oder Eindrücke), die 
die menschliche Entwicklung der Bewusstseinsfähigkeit ausgemacht haben 
und die gegenwärtige Bewusstseinsmöglichkeit des Individuums 
widerspiegeln—in dem Sinne ein kollektiver und zugleich individueller 
Bewusstseinsspeicher, wobei sich beide im jeweils anderen widerspiegeln. 
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Das Speicherbewusstsein trifft, als wahrnehmende Bewusstseinsbasis, keine 
Unterscheidungen; es speichert ungefiltert alle Eindrücke im Leben des 
jeweiligen Menschen. Diese Eindrücke, oder erste Stufe von Erfahrung, 
liefern den Ausgangspunkt von weiterer Verursachung, die sich von 
Eindruck zu Eindruck fortsetzt und entwickelt. Das ālayavijñāna stellt so 
den Grund dar, auf dem sich durch Ursache-und-Wirkungs-Verknüpfung 
unterscheidende Bewusstseinsfunktionen ausbilden können. Diese 
Funktionen erschaffen das, was in einer—aus dieser buddhistischen Sicht—
falschen Anschauung als objektive Welt erlebt wird, die vordergründig 
durch eine Subjekt-Objekt-Aufspaltung gekennzeichnet ist (Golzio, 1995, S. 
59ff.).
Manas-vijñāna, Manovijñāna
Im Laṅkāvatārasūtra wird der Prozess zu einem unterscheidenden, 
bewertenden Bewusstsein über die Vermittlung des manas (‚Denken‘) 
beschrieben, das die reine Wahrnehmungsverarbeitung hin zu einem sich 
dem Erfahrungsprozess gegenüberstellenden Bewusstsein steuert. Die 
Einordnung der Tätigkeit des Denkens erfolgt über das manovijñāna 
(‚Denkerkennen‘), das, als unterscheidendes Bewusstsein, den 
entscheidenden Schritt zu einer Einteilung der durch die geistigen Prozesse 
hervorgerufenen Vorstellungen durchführt. Die vijñānas der fünf Sinne 
Buddhism as a Psychological System
93
(Seh-, Hör-, Geruchs-, Geschmacks- und Tastsinn) sind mit dem 
manovijñāna als ordnender Instanz verbunden und bilden zusammen die 
Voraussetzung der Ausbildung eines Ich-Bewusstseins (Golzio, 1995, S. 
66ff.).
Alle den Menschen als Individuum ausmachenden Bewusstseinsfaktoren 
sind miteinander verbunden, arbeiten aber auch als eigene Entität, was die 
Erkenntnis und Erkenntnisfähigkeit des Individuums ermöglicht. Nach der 
Psychologie des Laṅkāvatārasūtras erlebt sich der Mensch dann als 
abgeschlossenes Ich-Subjekt, wenn er die verschiedenen Bewusst-
seinssysteme und deren Verursachungen und wechselseitige Beeinflussung, 
die ihn als denkendes Wesen ausmachen, nicht als verschieden erkennt, 
sondern in deren Zusammenspiel als inneren Wesenskern (Selbst) der 
Person annimmt. Dies führt aus buddhistischer Sicht zu Leiden, da es der 
eigentlichen Realität des Daseins zuwiderläuft.
Spiegelungen des Geistes
Zugleich wird im Laṅkāvatārasūtra jedoch darauf hingewiesen, dass die 
Verursachungen, die das ‚Material’ der Denktätigkeit des Menschen liefern, 
selbst nichts anderes als Spiegelungen des Geistes sind. Die reale oder 
objektive Welt, die das Individuum in Abgrenzung und Einordnung 
konstruiert, ist nur eine geistig erschaffene und als solche, wenn das relativ, 
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vom jeweiligen Individuum Wahrnehmbare als real interpretiert wird, eine 
Illusion, die den Menschen von der wahren Erkenntnis seiner inneren Natur 
(Buddha-Natur) abhält. Dass die Welt auch kollektiv objektiv konstruiert 
werden kann, ist über die Verbindung jeglichen individuellen Bewusstseins 
zu einem citta als All-Bewusstsein erklärbar. Diese objektive Welt kann 
daher, der Laṅkāvatāra-Psychologie folgend, in der Wahrnehmung 
verschiedener Menschen mehr oder minder die gleichen Ausprägungen 
ausbilden.
Es ist der Verstand des Individuums selbst, der die objektive Welt 
erschafft, indem das durch manas vermittelte Erleben der Sinnen-vijñānas 
nicht als individuelle und zur gleichen Zeit jedoch durch das absolute citta 
verbundene Bewusstseinsfaktoren erkannt werden. Da diese objektive Welt 
bei ähnlichen karmischen Voraussetzungen von verschiedenen Individuen 
ähnlich erschaffen wird, kann die Illusion selbiger Bestand haben und wird 
so im manovijñāna als unterscheidender Verursachungskomplex verankert.
Dieser Verursachungskomplex, der selbst schon eine Illusion ist, nährt 
dann weitere unterscheidende Bewusstseinsvorgänge, die sich in der 
Wahrnehmung und Einordnung des Wahrgenommenen zeigen. 
Unterscheidende Bewusstseinsvorgänge entstehen so aus einer sich 
andauernd fortsetzenden Ursache-Wirkungs-Kette, wobei auch diese Kette 
und deren Geschichte eine rein geistig erschaffene ist—und ebenso keine 
objektive Entität—und als solche zugleich existent wie nicht-existent 
Buddhism as a Psychological System
95
(Golzio, 1995, S. 80ff.). Diese Paradoxie in der Erkenntnistheorie des 
Laṅkāvatārasūtra ist eine Grundvoraussetzung, um auf das 
Unaussprechbare und diskursiv nicht Erfassbare in der Erkenntnis 
hinzuweisen.
Geist und Erfahrung
Das alles umfassende citta ist eine reine Erlebensqualität und nicht durch 
eine diskursive Logik beschreibbar, bringt aber selbige zugleich hervor. Der 
Mensch kann sich in seinem gegenwärtigen Erleben nur aus seiner 
individuellen Geschichte, die durch eine Ursache-Wirkungs-Kette entsteht, 
verstehen. In diesem Erleben selbst spiegelt sich aber zugleich die 
Relativierung des Erlebens oder individuellen Erleben-Könnens wider, da 
die Art und Weise der mentalen Verarbeitung und daraus folgenden 
Konstruktion der unterscheidenden Erfahrung immer relativ auf die 
Verursachungen des Individuums zurückzuführen sind. Es kann daher 
keinen inneren Wesenskern im Individuum geben, sondern nur eine 
geschichtliche Verknüpfung von Bewusstseinsinhalten, deren Realisation, 
aus dieser buddhistischen Sicht, den Ausgangspunkt liefert, um die 
dahinterliegende bewusstseinsverbindende Qualität zu erkennen und die 
unterscheidende Qualität der Bewusstseinsinhalte relativiert.
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Im Laṅkāvatārasūtra wird die Bewusstseinspsychologie, die das System 
der vijñānas und deren gegenseitiges Aufeinander-Bezogensein darlegt, an 
einer Stelle derart zusammengefasst:
Infolge des Sichstützens auf die Ursache entstehen die sieben 
Vijñanas. Das Manovijñāna besteht fort durch das Anhängen am 
Unterscheiden der Bereiche und wird ernährt durch Eindrücke des 
Ālayavijñāna. Das Manas bildet sich zusammen mit dem Begriff des 
Ich und dem, was dazugehört, an dem es hängt und worüber es 
nachdenkt. Es hat keinen selbständigen Körper und kein selbständiges 
Merkmal. Das Ālayavijñāna ist seine Ursache und seine Stütze. Die 
Gesamtheit des Geistes entwickelt sich in gegenseitiger Bedingtheit 
infolge des Anhängens an der Sichtweise, daß die Welt, die der Geist 
selbst ist, real ist. Wie die Wellen des Ozeans entsteht und vergeht die 
Welt, die der Geist selbst ist und die vom Wind der Sinnenwelt 
aufgewühlt wird. Deshalb, wenn man vom Manovijñāna befreit ist, ist 
man auch von den sieben Vijñānas befreit. (Golzio, 1995, S. 135)
Hier wird das manovijñāna dem ālayavijñāna, manas-vijñāna und den fünf 
Sinnen-vijñānas gegenübergestellt. Befreiung, oder das Ende eines 
Konstruierens der äußeren Welt als real oder objektiv durch ein 
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unterscheidendes Bewusstsein, geschieht durch die Erkenntnis, dass dieses 
Bewusstsein (das manovijñāna) nicht unabhängig von einem verbindenden 
Bewusstsein, aus dem heraus es selbst entsteht, erlebt werden kann. In 
diesem Sinne ist die Verbindung, die den Ausgangspunkt jeglicher 
Individualität ausmacht, in den Vordergrund getreten.
Unterscheidung und Nicht-Unterscheidung
Von Unterscheidung befreit zu sein, meint aber nicht, dass Unterscheidung 
nichtig wird, sondern dass im Erleben selbst die Relativierung eines 
unterscheidenden Erlebens stattfindet. Jeder Bewusstseinsakt trägt die 
Möglichkeit in sich, den Grund dieses Bewusstseinsaktes zu erkennen. 
Dieser Grund spiegelt sich im ālayavijñāna wider, aus dem die anderen 
unterscheidenden Bewusstseinsakte entstehen. Die Entstehung von 
Bewusstseinsakten selbst wird so in diesem System die Erklärung der 
Möglichkeit die Entstehung zu relativieren und richtig einzuordnen.
Im Laṅkāvatārasūtra wird das Ziel der buddhistischen Praxis—eine 
vollkommene Erkenntnis der Entstehung von Erleben durch Erleben selbst
—mit dem Begriff tathāgatagarbha (‚Embryo des So-Beschaffenen [ein 
Titel für Buddha]‘, was auf die Buddha-Natur in jedem Individuum 
verweist) in Verbindung gesetzt. Citta, ālayavijñāna und tathāgatagarbha 
werden im Laṅkāvatārasūtra sinngemäß oft synonym verwendet (Suzuki, 
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1930/1999), da das Speicherbewusstsein—ālayavijñāna—in sich die 
Potentialität der Verwirklichung eines Bewusstseins, das in der 
Wahrnehmung selbst alle Faktoren erkennt, die die Wahrnehmung und 
geistige Verarbeitung von Erlebensinhalten ausmachen, trägt. Diese 
potentielle Umkehr des Bewusstseinsgrundes im ālayavijñāna (Golzio, 
1995, S. 223ff.), auf der aufbauend alle Bewusstseinsvorgänge klar erkannt 
werden können, stellt das letztendliche Ziel der buddhistischen 
(Meditations-)Praxis dar (Brown, 1991).
Die Befreiung aus einer geschichtlichen Situation, die das Erleben des 
Individuums geprägt hat und seine jetzigen Erlebensmöglichkeiten und 
darauf folgendes Verhalten ausmacht, erfolgt, der Laṅkāvatāra-Psychologie 
nach, in jedem Moment des Erkennens in der geschichtlichen Situation 
selbst. Erleben relativiert Erleben, indem der Grund dieses Erlebens klar 
hervortreten kann. Der Grund—tathāgatagarbha oder citta (oder 
ālayavijñāna im gerade erläuterten Sinne)—übersteigt jegliches 
unterscheidendes Bewusstsein, ist aber ohne dieses nicht erlebbar. 
Bewusstseinserkenntnis bedeutet im Hier und Jetzt des erkennenden 
Menschen ein Heraustreten und zugleich Eingebettet-Sein in die 
gegenwärtige Bewusstseinsfähigkeit, da sich beides gegenseitig bedingt und 
erfordert.
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Indras Netz
Eine weitere, auf der Cittamātra(‚Nur-Geist‘)-Bewusstseinspsychologie 
aufbauende, für den Buddhismus entscheidende Frage betrifft das 
Zusammenwirken von Erleben und Beziehung. Ein Bild aus einer 
bedeutenden Richtung des Mahāyāna-Buddhismus—der Huayan(Chinesisch 
‚Blumengirlande‘, Japanisch Kegon)-Schule—verdeutlicht eine phäno-
menale Verbindung und Abhängigkeit, in die das menschliche Erleben 
eingebettet ist.6 Es beschreibt das Netz des Gottes Indra.7 Dieses besteht aus 
einem in alle Richtungen unendlich weit reichenden Netzgewebe, das mit 
Juwelen an seinen Knoten behangen ist. Die Juwelen hängen derart, dass 
man in der Spiegelung eines Juwels—wenn man seine Oberfläche betrachtet
—alle anderen Juwelen im Netz sehen kann. Dies gilt für jedes einzelne, 
betrachtete Juwel und da es unendlich viele Juwelen sind—das Netz hat 
keine Beschränkung—spiegelt sich in jedem einzelnen eine unendliche 
Anzahl von anderen Juwelen wider. Die Spiegelungen selbst, die die 
gesamte Struktur begleiten, sind daher ebenfalls unendlich (Cook, 1977; 
Cleary, 1983).
Dieses Bild des Kosmos als interdependentes Geflecht, indem sich in 
jedem einzelnen Phänomen die Gesamtheit aller Phänomene widerspiegelt, 
bildet die Grundlage für Erleben aus der Sichtweise dieser buddhistischen 
Philosophie. In jedem Ding (Sanskrit dharma) zeigt sich in der tieferen 
Erkenntnis des Aufeinander-bezogen-Seins und In-Dialog-Stehens der 
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Phänomene die absolute Wahrheit dieses Phänomens. Nach der Huayan-
Philosophie ist die Erkenntnis, dass alle Phänomene nur aus ihrer Beziehung 
zueinander als einzelnes, charakteristisches Phänomen Bestand haben 
können, ein Erkennen der inhärenten Leere (śūnyatā) aller Phänomene.8
Erleben phänomenaler Interdependenz
Phänomene stehen immer in Beziehung zueinander und sind nur aus ihrer 
Interdependenz in Bezug auf andere Phänomene erklärbar. Cook (1977) 
beschreibt das Verhältnis von Identität und Interdependenz von Phänomenen 
als zwei Seiten derselben Münze, was für ein Verständnis dieses dynamisch-
dialogischen Erlebens und daraus folgendem Verhalten wichtig ist. Erleben 
ist grundsätzlich als in Beziehung stehend zu betrachten. Das Erleben des 
Einzelnen entsteht in einem Beziehungsgeflecht, einem Raum, in dem sich 
aus Einflüssen und Impulsen heraus ein statisches Element, wie eine Ich- 
oder Selbst-Identität, entwickeln kann. Die dynamische Bezogenheit dieses 
Ich zu allen anderen Phänomenen lässt die Ich-Identität als nur aus der 
Beziehung heraus ergreifbar beschreiben. Ein Ich, das selbst Beziehung ist 
und aus Beziehung hervorgeht, kann sich nicht der Beziehung 
gegenüberstellen.
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Wie können Erlebensdimesionen in dieser Beziehung verstanden 
werden? Fazang9 gibt eine Erklärung zu Indras Netz, die sich in Bezug auf 
diese Frage weiter zu verfolgen lohnt.
This [the contemplation of the net of Indra] means that with self as 
principal, one looks to others as satellites or companions; or else one 
thing or principle is taken as principal and all things or principles 
become satellites or companions; or one body is taken as principal and 
all bodies become satellites. Whatever single thing is brought up, 
immediately principal and satellite are equally contained, multiplying 
infinitely – this represents the nature of things manifesting reflections 
multiplied and remultiplied in all phenomena, all infinitely. This is 
also the infinite doubling and redoubling of compassion and wisdom. 
(Cleary, 1983, S. 168)
Die Netzwerkmetaphorik verweist auf Entstehen in Abhängigkeit in der 
Erfahrung selbst. Erfahrung im Moment ist das Produkt einer Ursache-
Wirkungs-Vernetzung, die aus mehreren Richtungen heraus beschrieben 
werden kann. Zum einen kommt dabei deutlich der geschichtliche Aspekt 
des individuellen Erlebens zum Vorschein. Jedes gegenwärtige Erleben ist 
ein Produkt einer Verursachungskette, die die eigene Geschichte als 
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Individuum und darüber hinaus die Beeinflussungen, die diese 
Individuumsgeschichte in Gang gesetzt haben, deutlich werden lässt. Diese 
Geschichte steht aber zugleich immer auch in einem relationalen Netzwerk, 
das selbst wiederum geschichtlich gesehen werden kann.
Da laut Huayan-Philosophie sich in jedem Teil das Ganze widerspiegelt, 
ist Erleben selbst nicht auf ein Individuum beschränkt. Individuelles Erleben 
ist netzwerkartig als Ganzes mit menschlichem Erleben an sich verbunden 
und menschliches Erleben ist wiederum mit anderen Phänomenen verknüpft
—was sich unendlich fortsetzen lässt. Somit ist der Teil das Ganze und das 
eigene Erleben ist das andere Erleben. Dies gilt für jedes dharma 
(‚Phänomen’), das entsteht, und beschreibt damit auch geistige Vorgänge—
die aus dieser buddhistischen Sicht genauso wie alle anderen Dinge der 
Verursachung unterliegen und daher auf derselben phänomenalen Ebene zu 
betrachten sind—, die sich letztendlich immer nur aus einem 
Beziehungsgeflecht bilden können.
Dabei kommt sehr stark ein kommunikativ-interdependenter Aspekt in 
Bezug auf psychische Vorgänge zur Geltung. Denk- und Erlebensvorgänge 
verlieren ihre Bezogenheit auf ein Ich oder Selbst und bilden ihrer Natur 
nach einen kommunikativen Raum aus—jeder psychische Vorgang ist in 
gewisser Hinsicht eine Kommunikation mit unendlich vielen anderen 
Phänomenen, da er aus diesen Phänomenen entsteht und selbst diese 
Phänomene widerspiegelt, die nicht getrennt vom Vorgang selbst sein 
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können. Jegliches Erleben und Verhalten findet in einem kommunikativen 
Netzwerk mit anderen Phänomenen statt und es ist dieses Netzwerk, das die 
gegenwärtige Aktion des Menschen bestimmt.
Die eigene Impulssetzung im Handeln kann nur dann im Sinne dieses 
Netzwerkes sein, wenn man sich der gegenseitigen, phänomenalen 
Abhängigkeit als Ausgangssituation nicht widersetzt und nicht in einer 
Identitätsbestimmung, die auf Abgrenzung basiert, gedankliche 
Verursachungen erzeugt, was nach buddhistischer Auffassung zu Leidem 
führt. Der Mensch kann daher nie bei sich selbst sein, oder bleiben, sondern 
ist immer ein ‚Zwischen-Wesen’. Leben bestimmt sich als ein 
Dazwischensein, da Interdependenz und Identität eine dynamische Einheit 
bilden und in jedem Augenblick die Relationalität hervortritt, die im 
Moment entsteht und die gegenwärtige Situation des Individuums ausmacht.
Noten
1 Anātman (‚Nicht-Ich, Nicht-Selbst‘) stellt den Gegenpol zu ātman 
(‚Ich, Selbst, Seele‘) dar. Der Buddhismus verneint einen inneren, ewigen 
Wesenskern im Menschen.
2 ‚Psychologie des Buddhismus’ oder ‚Buddhistische Psychologie’ 
bezeichnet in diesem Artikel Anteile buddhistischer Traditionen und 
Schriften, die sich in besonderem Ausmaß mit den Grundlagen 
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menschlichen Erlebens und Verhaltens auseinandersetzen (Kalupahana, 
1987). Es handelt sich dabei um eine konstruierte Unterscheidung, da der 
Buddhismus selbst, als System, keine disziplinären Abgrenzungen kennt 
(Virtbauer, 2008a). Inwieweit es gerechtfertigt ist, diese Konstruktion 
‚Psychologie’ zu nennen, wird innerhalb der Buddhismuskunde kontrovers 
diskutiert—siehe Gómez (2004), der auch auf wesentliche Rezeptionen 
innerhalb der westlichen Psychologie eingeht. Drei gegenwärtige Zugänge 
im wissenschaftlichen Arbeiten mit dem Buddhismus als psychologischem 
System beschreibe ich in Virtbauer (2008b).
3 Die anderen Komponenten, Substanzgruppen oder Aggregate sind 
Formfaktoren (rūpa), Empfindung (vedanā), Perzeption (saṃjñā) und 
Willensfaktoren (saṁskāra).
4 Die klassischen Arbeiten zum Sanskritoriginal dieses sūtras führten 
Nanjio Bunyiu (1923) und Suzuki Daisetsu Teitaro (1930/1999; 1932; 1934) 
durch. Eine neuere Übersetzung aus dem Sanskrit, die ich hier als 
deutschsprachiges Referenzwerk für Verweise verwende, stammt von Karl-
Heinz Golzio (1995). Die von mir argumentierte, psychologische 
Systematik von Leitgedanken ist angesichts der Komplexität des sūtras und 
der daher mannigfaltigen Ausgestaltungen von Interpretationen zu 
Detailpunkten seiner Philosophie nicht zwingend gegeben (siehe Dumoulin, 
2005; Schmithausen, 2007; Sutton, 1991). Der systematische Fokus 
verweist auf die Möglickkeit von interdisziplinärem Dialog zwischen der 
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Cittamātra(Sanskrit ‚Nur-Geist‘)-Philosophie des Laṅkāvatārasūtra und 
westlich philosophisch psychologischen und psychotherapeutischen 
Zugängen und auf die Intention und praktisch gegenwärtige Bedeutung des 
sūtras, in dem die buddhistische (Meditations-)Praxis im Vordergrund steht 
(Golzio, 1995, S. 95ff.).
5 Siehe die Beschreibungen Dōgens (Japan, 1200–53) zu dieser 
Nichtunterscheidung im Shōbōgenzō-Faszikel Busshō (Japanisch ‚Buddha-
Natur‘; Waddell & Abe, 2002; Virtbauer, 2009). Er löst die entscheidende 
Frage des Mahāyāna und Zen, wer oder welche Wesen die Buddha-Natur 
besitzen, indem er auf die logisch-diskursive Unlösbarkeit dieser Frage 
anspielt, da eine Erlebensqualität wie Buddha-Natur mit allen Phänomenen 
verbunden ist und alle Phänomene erfasst: „Whether you speak of ‘living 
beings,’ ‘sentient beings,’ ‘all classes of living things,’ or ‘all varieties of 
living beings,’ it makes no difference. The words entire being [shitsuu] 
mean both sentient beings and all beings. In other words, entire being is the 
Buddha-nature: I call the whole integral entity of entire being ‘sentient 
beings.’ Just as the very time when things are thus, both inside and outside 
of sentient beings are, as such, the entire being of the Buddha-
nature” (Waddell & Abe, 2002, S. 60ff.).
6 Die Schule führt ihren Namen, Huayan, auf die gleichnamige Schrift 
Huayan jing (Sanskrit Avataṃsakasūtra; Cleary, 1993) zurück, die die 
Grundlage ihrer philosophischen Psychologie bildet.
Gerald Virtbauer
106
7 Indra ist eine alt-indoarische Gottheit (an der Spitze des vedischen 
Pantheons), die in der buddhistischen Kosmologie eine wichtige Rolle 
spielt.
8 Die śūnyatā liegt Interdependenz auf einer tieferen Ebene in der 
Huayan-Philosophie zugrunde. Das Konzept kann zu missverständlichen, 
vor allem nihilistischen, Interpretationen führen. Für eine psychologische 
Beschreibung dieses Konzepts in Bezug auf Nāgārjunas 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā siehe Virtbauer (2008a).
9 Fazang (643–712) ist der dritte Patriach der Huayan-Schule in China 
und die für die Entwicklung und Etablierung selbiger wohl wichtigste 
Persönlichkeit.
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5	
 Dimensions of intersubjectivity in 
Mahāyāna-Buddhism and relational 
psychoanalysis
Virtbauer, Gerald Dōkō. (2010). Dimensions of intersubjectivity in 
Mahāyāna-Buddhism and relational psychoanalysis. Contemporary 
Buddhism, 11(1), 85–102. doi: 10.1080/14639941003791584
Buddhism has become one of the main dialogue partners for 
different psychotherapeutic approaches. As a psychological 
ethical system, it offers structural elements that are compatible 
with psychotherapeutic theory and practice. A main concept in 
Mahāyāna-Buddhism and postmodern psychoanalysis is 
intersubjectivity. In relational psychoanalysis the individual is 
analysed within a matrix of relationships that turn out to be the 
central power in her/his psychological development. By 
realising why one has become the present individual and how 
personal development is connected with relationships, the 
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freedom to choose and create a life that is independent from 
inner restrictions should be strengthened. In Mahāyāna-
Buddhism, intersubjectivity is the result of an understanding of 
all phenomena as being in interdependent connection. Human 
beings are a collection of different phenomena and in constant 
interchange with everything else. Personal happiness and 
freedom from suffering depends on how this interchange can be 
realised in experience. The article focuses on the philosophical 
psychological fundaments in both approaches and emphasizes 
clarification of to what the term ‘intersubjectivity’ exactly refers. 
This clarification is essential for the current dialogues, as well as 
further perspectives in this interdisciplinary field.
If we reflect deeply, we will discover that every way we have defined 
ourselves has always been in relation to something or someone else. If 
this is true, who are we beyond our self-definitions? (Flickstein 2009, 
1)
The dialogue between Buddhism and psychoanalysis has become an 
important and integrated part of different theoretical and practical 
approaches within psychotherapy. Influences of Buddhist thought and 
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practice are currently recognisable in nearly all schools of psychotherapy 
and signify one approach of how Buddhism is absorbed as a psychological 
system (Virtbauer 2008b). In this article I consider the concept of 
intersubjectivity in its significance for an understanding of human 
experience and behaviour. Intersubjectivity is a critical term in the 
discourses between Mahāyāna-Buddhism and relational psychoanalysis 
(Wallace 2001; Mitchell 2000; Safran 2003).
The reception of Buddhist thought in western countries is the starting 
point for this dialogue. In this reception a clearly visible shift has taken 
place in psychology and psychotherapy within the past decades, as many of 
the early shortenings and misunderstandings about Buddhism could be 
overcome through interdisciplinary work and more detailed scholarships, as 
well as the global dialogue with Buddhist teachers (Epstein 2007; Langan 
2006; Mathers, Miller, and Ando 2009; Pickering 1997; Safran 2003; 
Wallace and Shapiro 2006).
Developments in western Buddhism are, to a significant extent, 
influenced by the dialogue with science (especially psychology) and some 
describe them as the evolution of a new Buddhism (see, for example, 
Brazier 2001; Coleman 2001; Ivy 2005). Considering the history of 
Buddhism these developments are not surprising, as Buddhism has adapted 
to and incorporated existing approaches to human experience and behaviour 
in new cultural settings.
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In the following, I compare the Mahāyāna-Buddhist with the relational 
psychoanalytical concept of intersubjectivity, and show possibilities of links 
and integrations. The main focus lies on psychological bases of the two 
approaches to experience and behaviour. The intersubjective fundaments on 
which many of the current dialogues between Buddhism and postmodern 
psychoanalysis are based should be clarified. Buddhism is thereby mainly 
tackled from a Zen-perspective within Mahāyāna philosophy, considering 
the important role this perspective plays in the contemporary dialogues 
between psychoanalysis and Buddhism (see, for example, Cooper 2004; 
Magid 2005; Mruk and Hartzell 2003; Suler 1993).
The significance of intersubjectivity in Mahāyāna-Buddhism
A quote from Thich Nhat Hanh is a good starting point for a discussion of 
Buddhist practice, and the behaviour based on this practice:
When you understand, you cannot help but love. You cannot get angry. 
To develop understanding, you have to practice looking at all living 
beings with the eyes of compassion. When you understand, you love. 
And when you love, you naturally act in a way that can relieve the 
suffering of people. (Thich Nhat Hanh 1987, 14–5)
Buddhism as a Psychological System
115
In this piece a connection can be clearly seen, which is one of the central 
points in Buddhist practice—the connection between understanding and 
behaviour. From a Buddhist perspective, the main challenge for human 
beings is to face the transience of being, and the role phenomena1 play 
concerning the human predicament. Buddhist practice should be a 
methodical support for facing this challenge and proceeding on the way. 
Thich Nhat Hanh states compassion (Sanskrit karuṇā) for all living beings 
as the means that should lead to understanding. Further, understanding and 
love build a logical unity in transforming one’s own suffering (duḥkha) in 
life, which is always connected with the suffering of others.
Seeing clearly into the characteristics of one’s own existence and the 
connection that creates this existence, and in which it is embedded, is the 
goal of Buddhism, which should lead to an ending of suffering. Suffering is 
the result of the opposite; the less clearly the characteristics of being are 
recognised, the more a human being suffers in life.
Buddhism developed as a doctrine of Non-Self (anātman). This doctrine 
is the main requisite for learning what intersubjectivity indicates from a 
Buddhist point of view. In one of the most important Zen treatises, the 
Shōbōgenzō (Japanese, ‘Treasury of the true dharma eye’), the Japanese Zen 
patriarch Dōgen (1200–53 CE) gives the following explanation of how to 
study the Self in connection with Zen practice:
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To learn the Buddha Way is to learn one’s self. To learn one’s self is to 
forget one’s self. To forget one’s self is to be confirmed by all 
dharmas. To be confirmed by all dharmas is to cast off one’s body and 
mind and the bodies and minds of others as well. (Waddell and Abe 
2002, 41)
Dōgen emphasises the study of the human Self within Buddhist practice 
(‘the Buddha Way’; Virtbauer 2009).2 As soon as one learns (what) the Self 
(is), one forgets it. This points to features of the human psyche, which is 
seen without an inner and unchangeable core. Humans are characterised as a 
collection or accumulation of different substantial and insubstantial (mental) 
aggregates (Sanskrit skandhas). The interplay of these aggregates 
constitutes the individual. Natural phenomena (dharmas) are in a 
communicating connection, and humans are embedded in this connection 
(‘confirmed by all dharmas’). This means that human individuals need to be 
analysed as a part within nature, on a communicative, phenomenal level. 
From a Buddhist perspective, all dharmas refer to a cause-and-effect-
principle. Thoughts and mental phenomena are, like form-factors of the 
human predicament, analysable within their historical development. Within 
the cause-and-effect-relation, all phenomena interrelate and each individual 
phenomenon can only be analysed in its specific characteristic in connection 
with its particular development. This development always refers to other 
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phenomena that have given the impulses for the formation of the specific 
phenomenon in a network of causation.
A specific perception of a human being, for example, is always connected 
with an individually unique history that constitutes the person in this certain 
moment in a way that he perceives exactly through his own and unique 
shaping of the perceived. This fact, which is similarly recognised in western 
psychology of perception, is also connected with a broader phenomenal 
level in Buddhist thought. Not only is the psychological accentuation of the 
perceiving individual but also the whole development and history of 
phenomena explained through causation. The human being who perceives at 
a certain moment is a collection of phenomena that acquire their specific 
characteristics within a network of causation. The person can only be 
characterised as an individual within this phenomenal interplay (see, for 
example, Sekida 1985).
The idea of a Self—as the innermost core of the person—develops if 
different attributes, in their interplay, are not recognised as divided entities 
and, due to their interdependence, connected at the same time. This is the 
result if the individual sees himself/herself apart from the personal history 
that creates perception and thinking, and interprets the psychological 
connections, which are the result of cause and effect, as an inner base or 
core of himself/herself. This base, core, or soul does not exist in the 
Buddhist understanding of the person. In the Buddhist way of approaching 
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human nature, a human being—as a being which consists of specific 
‘heaps’ or collections of phenomena—is subject to constant change. This 
change is the result of interdependence and interchange on a phenomenal 
level, which refers to the law of cause and effect. Phenomenal 
interdependence and change, which constitute the individual, are in the 
same way connected with outer phenomena. The division between a 
human’s inner life and the relationship to other individuals, or—in a broader 
sense—the outer phenomenal world, vanished in this worldview. 
Phenomena and also the individual—as a specific accumulation of 
phenomena—are only analysable within their connection to other 
phenomena.
An example in which this connection and linking between all phenomena 
comes across very vividly is the net of Indra,3 which signifies the 
importance of interdependence and intersubjectivity for humans in 
Mahāyāna-Buddhism. Indra’s net is depicted as an endless fishing net with 
jewels on its knots. The jewels hang in such a way that in each jewel all 
other jewels are reflected. When looking at one jewel, one sees all other 
jewels within this particular jewel. Because of the infinity of the net, each 
jewel, in fact, reflects infinitely many other jewels. The characteristic 
appearance of each single jewel is only guaranteed due to the connection 
and mutual dependence to all other jewels (Cleary 1983; Cook 1977). This 
picture clarifies the interdependent connection between phenomena. The 
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characteristic of one phenomenon can only be tackled in its association with 
other phenomena.
The psychological situation of humans and an understanding of the 
present mental occurrences always depend on a mutual interdependent 
connection to the outer world (Thuan 2001). Inner and outer are relativised 
through this connection. Thus, intersubjectivity is one main characteristic of 
Buddhist psychology (Wallace 2001). To learn the characteristics of human 
experience requires the examination of the individual within her specific 
network-like connections. As Dōgen states in the last part of the quotation 
above, this examination should enable a human being to discard conditioned 
ideas and constructions about the own body and mind (‘cast off one’s body 
and mind’) and others’ bodies and minds.
Psychoanalysis and intersubjectivity
The term intersubjectivity, referring to the psychological development of the 
individual and the curative effect of psychoanalysis, has recently assumed 
greater importance for the discourses within psychoanalysis due to the 
development of relational psychoanalysis. This intersubjective turn within 
psychoanalysis is marked by a paradigm change concerning the 
psychological human structure (Altmeyer and Thomä 2006; Hoffman et al. 
2005; Mitchell 2000). Relational psychoanalysis mainly developed due to 
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Steven Mitchell’s (1988) attempt to integrate different psychoanalytic 
streams and a new and different reading of Freud’s fundamentals—based on 
cultural and societal changes that required philosophy-of-science and 
practical innovations.
Freud (1905/1999) expounds, in his drive theory, a view on the human 
predicament, which was determining for the further development of 
psychoanalysis. At this point, he stated that sexual drives were the source of 
psychological development. Later he introduced a duality between sexual 
life and aggressive death drives (Freud 1920/1999). One important factor 
that he illustrates especially in his structural theory (Freud 1923/1999) is put 
into perspective in relational approaches. The basic human motivation that 
leads to the development of psychological attributes is always connected 
with a particular somatic state which forces the individual to react in some 
way or another. The ego of the person plays the negotiating role between the 
somatic source and following drives (id qualities), inhibitions (super ego 
qualities), and outer circumstances. Ego-strength enables the human 
individual to control and organise his/her behaviour in a way that is 
compatible with the cultural demands for a life together with others. A 
developed and fulfilling life together within the cultural framework is the 
final goal in Freud’s psychology. Psychoanalysis is the method of analysing 
and clarifying the human predicament and potential. A cultural and societal 
setting that helps to balance the sublimation of drive-energy into cultural 
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achievements and the possibility of living one’s sexuality without too many 
restrictions can lead to alliance and happiness.
The natural predisposition of humans is opposed to the possibility of a 
peaceful life together (Freud 1927/1999, 1930/1999). It is marked by 
somatic states of tension, which manifest in the duality of life and death 
drives. Human nature is determined to, first of all, search for the reduction 
and removal of these states. Therefore, it is in many ways directed against 
other beings. For Freud (1927/1999), the protection of humans against their 
own innermost nature is thus one of the main tasks of culture.
Freud’s objectifying scientific approach comes to light in his view on 
(human) nature and the systematic linking of bodily and psychological 
states. He sees the human mind in analogy with science, and both converge 
in their ability to get an objective hold on reality. This way of approaching 
science—as was the common, modern way in Freud’s time—not only 
theoretically but, in the case of the intersubjective turn within contemporary 
psychoanalysis, also practically reaches its limits very quickly.
Relational psychoanalysis’s philosophy of science is grounded in 
postmodern thought, which denies the possibility of objectifying and 
generalizing certain approaches to reality (including sciences and religions). 
The Freudian approach to reality and the clarifying quality of 
psychoanalysis, which he puts opposite to societal illusions (as e.g. 
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philosophy, or religion), lose their justification. Science itself, like 
psychoanalysis, which Freud (for example 1933/1999) always placed 
emphatically within the scientific worldview, is seen on the same level as 
other (non-scientific) human approaches to reality and experience. It is one 
of many specific approaches to the life world and reality (Mitchell 1993).
A change from substantial and rational thinking to thinking in proportion 
is the foundation of relational psychoanalysis. Metaphorically, the process is 
changed from a linear way of acquiring knowledge, in which more and more 
facts and theories resemble the state of the science, to a circular happening 
in which the circles and paradigms of acquiring knowledge need to be 
passed through and relativised again and again (Walach 2005). Hence, the 
primary purpose of psychoanalysis is not to provide the patient conceptual 
accounts of his experience divided from the therapeutic interaction and 
collect in this way more and more realised ‘facts’ about the individual. On 
the contrary, the patient’s experience and behaviour is seen in a circular, 
intersubjective relation that has formed the psychological possibilities and 
characteristics of the person. The therapeutic interaction should help in 
clarifying this relation (Stolorow and Atwood 1992; Orange, Atwood, and 
Stolorow 1997).
Mitchell (1993) describes this change of focus as a shift in the 
therapeutic interaction—from an interpreting knowledge of inner events to a 
realisation out of the analytic relationship, in which the patterns that have 
Buddhism as a Psychological System
123
shaped the psychological characteristics of the individual can manifest in 
the intersubjective action between individuals (analysand and analyst). The 
notion of an intersubjective development of the human psyche is 
foundational for this therapy setting and is mirrored in the form of 
interaction.
Mind has been redefined from a set of predetermined structures 
emerging from inside an individual organism to transactional patterns 
and internal structures derived from an interactive, interpersonal 
field. (Mitchell 1988, 17)
The Freudian starting point concerning human experience and behaviour—
his drive theory—shifts in this approach from the source to a part within an 
intersubjective matrix that is the basis for an understanding of all aspects of 
human development, including drives.
Structural features of intersubjectivity
The deeper meaning of the term ‘intersubjectivity’ from a Buddhist and 
psychoanalytic perspective can be revealed in its significance as a forming 
factor for the psychological human structure. One of the early and, from my 
point of view, most important psychoanalytic approaches to an 
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intersubjective understanding of human development, which can be 
connected to Buddhist ideas, comes from Hans Loewald. His approach is 
very much based on Freudian terminology, which, however, he interpreted 
in his own characteristic way. Loewald’s impulses are essential for the 
development of relational psychoanalysis (Chodorow 2004; Mitchell 2000). 
The main idea in his psychoanalysis is an experience of unity between 
individual inner life and the outer world.
A unitary, global experience is the basis of an understanding of individual 
development, as well as cultural and societal states, which reveal themselves 
for example in arts or religions. Loewald defines this experience as follows: 
‘This unitary experience perhaps may best be called being, if we do not 
immediately think of it as contrasted with “having been,”  “becoming,” 
“having,”  or “doing”’ (1978/2000a, 553). The striving after an experience of 
wholeness is the main motivation in life for the individual and mirrors life 
itself. Loewald’s idea of a fulfilled and, clinically speaking, healthy and 
developed experience is based on the psychological possibility of 
integration of this very often hidden and unconscious striving into the whole 
of daily life. At the same time, it is essential to discover it in all activities in 
daily life.
For Loewald, the experience of unity is comparable with Freud’s idea of 
the id within the psychological structure. In Loewald’s approach, the 
experience of unity underlies the structural development. He, like Freud, 
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states that the infant experiences a unity with the mother in early 
developmental stages, which is not based on divisions such as inside and 
outside, past and present, or physical and psychological. These distinctions, 
on the contrary, develop in a gradual process out of an experience of 
complete unity, which first manifests primarily in the experience with the 
mother.
Unlike Freud, Loewald asserts that not the somatic drive source, but the 
interactions with the outer world are the base of the development of 
distinctive functions. The duality and distinction between mine and yours, 
or inner and outer, develop slowly out of intersubjective actions. The 
starting point for psychological, structural elements—id, ego, and super ego
—lies in internalised interactions with the environment (object relations). 
Internalisation and externalisation, in the sense of a working-through of 
intersubjective experience and relating to the outer world, based on this 
working through, are the basis of the psychological structure. Hence, this 
structure is grounded on an experience of unity, which continues to be the 
main force in human experience. Experience itself gets more and more 
refined with years of ongoing development of detaching from the 
environment in which this experience itself is embedded (Loewald 
1978/2000c). This detachment is important for growing up and effective 
living in the world, but might at the same time become a big problem if it 
prevents an experience of unity.
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For Loewald the keys for a deep and holistic human experience and 
happiness in life are the possibility of inner dialogue, and the integration of 
the experience of unity into a rational psychological apperception that is 
opposed to this experience. Loewald describes this dialogue as an action in 
which primary and secondary process’s elements converge. Freud’s 
approach to the primary and secondary processes thereby undergoes an 
intersubjective change. Freud (1900/1999) explains the primary process 
(Primärvorgang) as the action of the human psychological system, which is, 
with the somatic drive source as its origin, directed to straight reduction and, 
in this way, to a direct expression of drives in (re)actions. In the secondary 
process (Sekundärvorgang), the energy is directed into other, more 
conscious ways. This second process may work more or less well, 
depending on the psychological capacities of the individual. For Freud, a 
strong ego is essential for the integration of unconscious and repressed 
psychological contents into consciousness. Ego-strength enables the 
individual to not get lost within the ‘chaos’ of inner demands and outer 
reality. The individual should be able to make conscious decisions through 
the integration of repressed contents.
Loewald interprets a classic saying by Freund with a dialogical turn:
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Where id was, there ego shall come into being. Too easily and too 
often ego is equated with rigid, unmodulated, and unyielding 
rationality. So today we are moved to add: where ego is, there id shall 
come into being again to renew the life of the ego and of reason. 
(Loewald 1978/2000a, 541)
Unconscious contents of the id, which manifest within the primary process, 
are for Loewald of similar importance as conscious, secondary process 
psychological inner work. He talks of different modes of reality (Loewald 
1978/2000a). Human development can only progress fully in a dialogical 
confrontation and a swinging between unconscious and conscious. This 
communication goes beyond the borders of language (Loewald 1978/2000b) 
and enables a human being to be again and again caught and surprised 
through and in life. In this way, child-like curiosity and irrationality should 
not be sacrificed too much for a rigid and rational self that constructs reality. 
In Mitchell’s words: ‘For Loewald, only the enchanted life is a life worth 
living’ (2000, 29). The enchanted life always happens within an 
intersubjective space in which inner psychological qualities connect in a live 
interchange with the outer world. A natural change of different conscious 
and unconscious realities within mentation allows the person to experience 
the whole of being.
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If intersubjectivity is within all experience, also the understanding of 
deviating experience and behaviour needs to be modified. Within a 
relational matrix, there cannot be a normative structure that is superimposed 
from outside, because every human’s development can only be recognised 
within a unique connection of relationships. Mitchell (1988) distinguishes 
the two poles within the healing process in psychoanalysis as the realisation 
of infant experiences of relationships, which are the main forming factor for 
patterns in the development of further relationships, as well as, on the 
contrary, the freedom and openness for new ways of relational experience. 
An ‘objective’ psychopathology yields to an interaction in which the patient 
learns to connect his/her history of relationships with the experience of a 
personal ‘logic’ in his/her experience and behaviour, which is based on how 
relationships have shaped the person’s approaches to himself/herself and 
others. Realisations in the therapy, therefore, happen through the 
intersubjective action between analyst and analysand, and are not 
determinations of either one of them (Hoffman 1999; Stark 1999). The inner 
freedom for the patient in how to make decisions in life, which increase 
well-being and happiness, should in this way improve more and more.
If intersubjectivity between individuals is tackled in Buddhism, 
comparably with psychoanalysis, the human individual must be analysed on 
a phenomenological level. Intersubjectivity is the result of an understanding 
of human beings as being embedded in an interdependent net of phenomena. 
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All phenomena are in an indivisible connection to each other. The structure 
of this netting can be recognised and experienced by learning to understand 
cause and effect within experience in the phenomenal interplay. One of the 
most important textual treatises of how this mindfulness can develop 
through meditation and humans can come nearer to their original nature as 
described in Buddhism is the Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta (Pali Canon, 
Dīghanikāya 22/Majjhimanikāya 10; for translation see Vipassana Research 
Institute 2009)—‘The Great Discourse on the Establishing of Awareness’. 
The Sutta can be regarded as the foundation of meditation practice from 
different Mahāyāna perspectives. It describes how the interplay between 
phenomena can be realised through concentration. Human experience 
should become clear in its wholeness as embedded in this interplay.
The basic Buddhist statement concerning the human nature and potential, 
as described in this text, is that, through mindfulness in all activities in life, 
a more and more refined and clear realisation of the flow of experience will 
unfold. The means to reach this goal is a meditation that helps to focus on 
moment-to-moment-experience and to clarify the characteristics of this 
experience. In this way, the connection between certain sensations and 
thoughts, the further working through of thoughts, as well as feelings and 
associations, which accompany them, can be recognised in meditation.
In the Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta the method of how to develop 
mindfulness in meditation is described fourfold: referring to the body 
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(contemplative observing of the body, Pali kāyānupassanā), feelings 
(vedanānupassanā), mind (cittānupassanā), and mind objects 
(dhammānupassanā). The main characteristic of the Buddhist meditation 
technique is the ability to watch the succession of experiences. The basic 
prerequisite is a way of meditating that helps to focus on psychological 
occurrences and reduce their intensity (samatha meditation); for example, 
by concentration on a bodily phenomenon (like the breath). This should help 
to reduce the great diversity of psychological events and calm down the 
pace of how they occur. The calm and focused mind should, in a further 
step, be able to realise the connections and successions of different bodily 
and mental phenomena (vipassanā meditation).
In Mahāyāna-Buddhism, one main characteristic for this realisation, as 
shown with the example of Indra’s net, is the non-dividedness of 
phenomena in the sense of an ongoing interdependent interchange. Seeing 
psychological phenomena in this way, it is clear that human beings lack an 
innermost, fixed core like a Self or (eternal) soul. Hence, in individual 
human experience there is ongoing dialogical action with other humans and 
their experiences. But also the individual experience itself is already an 
expression of dialogue, which would not be possible without the 
interdependent connections. Thich Nhat Hanh (1987/1998) talks of 
‘interbeing’ (Vietnamese tiep hien); humans are always ‘between’, in a 
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constant interchange with phenomena. The border between human inner life 
and the outer world is thus put into perspective.
Buddhist experience is to a large extent connected with the possibility of 
relativising one’s own experience—as something that belongs to an 
encapsulated Self which connects with the outer world—which is 
comparable with Loewald’s concept of unitary experience. On a logical, 
discursive level this relativisation is not possible, because it is an 
experiential quality that goes beyond dualistic, logical, and linguistically 
distinguishable borders. From a Buddhist perspective, man and environment 
are in a deeper sense one and the same. Only in the phenomenal connection 
of the two can both be realised as (distinguished) entities. One concept in 
Mahāyāna-Buddhism, which tackles this non-thinkable experiential quality 
also in a logic and linguistic way, is the description of all phenomena as 
themselves empty.
Nāgārjuna (India, ~ second to third century CE; in the Zen-Buddhist 
traditional lineage, Nāgārjuna is seen as the 14th Indian patriarch; see 
Cleary 1998), the most important philosopher of the middle school within 
Mahāyāna—Madhyamaka—develops the idea of emptiness (Sanskrit 
śūnyatā) in relation to the psychological situation of humans.4 In the most 
significant work that is attributed to Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 
(‘The root Statement in Verse on the Middle School’)—see especially the 
18th chapter regarding the examination of the Self (ātma parīkṣā); for 
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example, translation (Tibetan version) with commentary by Garfield (1995)
—the method of clarifying the middle way, between nihilistic thinking and a 
concept of Self, works by showing the borders of a discursive logic. A 
discursive logic is confronted with a paradoxical, intuitive logic. Each 
statement that marks a certain occurrence is in the same way analysed with 
the opposite meaning. From this perspective, for example, the statement ‘I 
(as a distinguished individual) am divided from you (as another 
distinguished individual)’ would be complemented with the statement ‘I am 
not divided from you’, and both are true at the same time (A = Non-A). 
Nāgārjuna introduces four phrases of differentiation (catuṣkoṭikā; see 
Westerhoff 2006) in Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (XVIII: 8), which show a 
logic in which each phenomenon is A, Non-A, A and Non-A, and neither A 
nor Non-A. This tetralemma refers to the necessity of interdependence of all 
phenomena and, hence, the impossibility of stating any characteristic of a 
phenomenon in a discursive way. Also the terminus ‘interbeing’ from Thich 
Nhat Hanh points to this experiential, intuitive logic, which, ultimately, 
cannot be put in words.
In this connection, the teaching of the two truths (satyadvaya) is of 
crucial importance. Nāgārjuna does not deny, in a conventional sense (or 
relative truth; saṃvṛtisatya) that is based on language, distinguishable 
characteristics in nature, human life and its organisation. Language itself 
and therefore also philosophy and making statements about nature (even if 
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these statements—referring to Nāgārjuna’s and Dōgen’s philosophies—
deconstruct and relativise dualistic propositions and, hence, in a deeper 
sense also themselves; Loy 1999) are based on distinguishable components.
However, within this conventional truth always also an absolute, 
experiential and intuitive truth (paramārthasatya) that is beyond words and 
distinctions reveals itself. Only if this absolute truth of reality is integrated 
into the relative can life unfold in its natural way. All discursive and 
language-based thoughts or statements about reality are relative truths and 
thus, in a deeper sense, an illusion. Still, they are true in how the mind, in 
conventional thinking, is detached from wholeness, which is to a certain 
degree also necessary for responding to experience in daily life. These two 
truths can be psychologically compared with how Loewald describes the 
necessity of a live communication of conscious and unconscious levels of 
mentation. Yet, in the concept of the two truths, experience is tackled, like 
all other things, on a phenomenal level.
Phenomena are empty from Nāgārjuna’s perspective, because they are 
not describable as distinct phenomena, but only in their interdependent 
connection. Experience itself is, in a deeper sense, beyond logically 
conceptual cognition. Constructions of reality out of this cognition are 
questioned. The key to an understanding of phenomena, as well as the 
human psyche, lies in the relationality of the interdependent connection that 
marks, from a Buddhist perspective, the final realisation that determines 
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human being. Intersubjectivity is the result of this connection. A human 
being is always in a phenomenal inter-space in which her individuality is 
constituted. Man is, in a deeper sense, an inter-subject, because in each 
individual the relational connection to everything else is always manifested.
Consequences of intersubjective realisation
The possibilities, as well as borders, in the dialogue between Buddhist and 
psychoanalytic approaches to human experience and behaviour can be 
observed best in the consequences for individual behaviour, based on the 
realisation of intersubjective experience. It thus becomes clear that 
Buddhism is a system which goes beyond a scientific theory and 
methodology from a postmodern western philosophy-of-science 
perspective. In Buddhism the discovery of truth comes to the fore, whereas 
relational psychoanalysis is grounded in a postmodern way of thinking that 
denies the possibility of finding general truths.
However, streams of Mahāyāna-Buddhism are especially suitable for a 
dialogue with psychotherapies and psychologies, which are based on 
postmodern scientific thought. The final, absolute truth (paramārthasatya) 
in the lives of individuals cannot be discursively described or explained, but 
it is a subjective experience. Buddhism, in this sense, is primarily a method 
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out of which a realisation may follow, which transcends rational human 
logic.
An annotation of Fazang (China, 643–712 CE; the third patriarch of the 
Huayan school in China, which philosophy focuses specifically on 
interdependence) on the metaphor of Indra’s net helps to clarify why ethical 
behaviour is the result of an intersubjective experience in Buddhism:
This [the contemplation of the net of Indra] means that with self as 
principal, one looks to others as satellites or companions; or else one 
thing or principle is taken as principal and all things or principles 
become satellites or companions; or one body is taken as principal and 
all bodies become satellites. Whatever single thing is brought up, 
immediately principal and satellite are equally contained, multiplying 
infinitely—this represents the nature of things manifesting reflections 
multiplied and remultiplied in all phenomena, all infinitely. This is 
also the infinite doubling and redoubling of compassion and wisdom. 
(Translation in Clearly 1983, 168)
An infinite number of aspects of interplay between phenomena can always 
be recognised in human experience, referring to Fazang. Depending on the 
point of view, they may seem principal or peripheral, while in a deeper 
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sense this distinction does not exist. From a psychological point of view, 
this means for human experience that all experiences one has in the contact 
with others refer back to the own situation of this individual, within an 
interdependent matrix.
The logic of Buddhist ethics can be recognised clearly in the bodhisattva-
ideal of Mahāyāna-Buddhism, which hints at the potential of humans 
(Leighton 2003). A bodhisattva (Sanskrit, literally ‘capable of 
enlightenment’, or ‘enlightenment-being’) is a being that makes every effort 
to help, out of her realisation, all beings. Freedom from suffering is only 
possible in connection with freeing all others from suffering as well. The 
intention of a human being to devote her whole life to the well-being of 
others is thus not primarily an emphatic self-sacrifice, but the result of an 
experience that is not divided from others’ experiences. Intersubjectivity and 
the following affection and felt responsibility for others is the logical result 
of an extension and, finally, overcoming of the own Self. Other beings are 
for the bodhisattva therefore a part of his own being. To conduct a life of 
service and responsibility for others is the way to serve being itself and 
hence overcome suffering (see, for example, Cho 2000).
The description of human nature (‘Buddha nature’, buddhatā), or the 
human potential of developing his innermost nature, has definitive character 
in Mahāyāna-Buddhism in connection with the bodhisattva ideal. A human 
being is in her natural state and experiences life as it really is, if she 
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develops and fosters qualities that help to overcome all borders and 
distinctions, which lead to a strengthening of an ego-centred experience 
(see, for example, Brazier 1995).
The consequences of an intersubjective experience in relational 
psychoanalysis are practical, patient-oriented and therefore subjectively 
healing. Primarily, a postmodern psychoanalysis can be tackled as a means 
of deconstruction and reconstruction within a culturally, societally, and 
individually constructed world. The aim is to help the patient to become 
freer within his own experience through recognition of his own 
constructions and their histories. Restrictions that lead experiences in 
directions which distort the qualities of experience and produce suffering 
should, in this way, become clear. For the typical patient in contemporary 
psychoanalytic settings, who often does not have severe symptoms 
(Mitchell 1993), the embeddedness and adaptation within cultural settings is 
not the solution, as it often was in Freud’s time, but the problem.5 If a too 
rigid ‘functioning’ reduces the whole of experience to a more and more 
rational focus, the freedom for decision-making might be cut off in a way 
that causes suffering and the ongoing feeling of restrictions. Mitchell 
describes the goal of contemporary psychoanalysis:
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A successful analysis results in a much more complex experience of 
oneself than that with which one began. The analysand learns that 
there is much more to him than he has previously fully known or been 
able to use. The analyst’s attitude toward her own theories, themselves 
shifting and evolving products of mental life, becomes an important 
model in the expansion of the analysand’s experience of his own 
mental life. And at crucial points in any analysis, the analytic method 
itself becomes the focus of analytic inquiry and, in some sense, needs 
to be reconstructed, rediscovered in the context of each particular 
analytic dyad. (1993, 83–4)
The process includes all those involved—the analysand, the analyst, as well 
as the method of psychoanalysis itself. Psychoanalysis as a means of 
cultural, societal, and personal decipherment is itself a part of the 
constructed reality. As a theory and practice, developed by humans for 
humans, it finally cannot be excluded from the analysis itself and becomes a 
part of the dynamic interaction. In this integrative, contextual approach, the 
points of surprise and open-mindedness for new or revived contents of 
experience—which especially Loewald focuses on—have also effects on the 
therapy theory itself. Only through this openness can psychoanalysis meet 
the needs of intersubjective experience.
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Intersubjectivity in the psychoanalytic therapy reveals itself in the 
underlying setting, and this relativity serves the patient in his/her experience 
and behaviour as a guideline. The aim of relational psychoanalysis lies in 
the subjective finding of meaning and the possibility of active integration of 
freedom into the analysand’s experience. This is the result of the 
fundamentally intersubjective orientation.
The possibilities of expansion of the respective approaches can be 
detected as well through the borders in the dialogue between Buddhism and 
psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis is a scientific method, while Buddhism—
seen from a postmodern scientific point of view—shows elements that 
exceed a scientific system. A contemporary psychoanalysis should not be a 
worldview (Kernberg 2000) and also should not support the dichotomy of 
illusions (referring to Freud, e.g. religion) and scientific rationality. As a 
method that distances itself from general statements of how to understand 
what truth means, it is yet based on the experiences of humans in which 
these statements, or the experience of personal truth, are a fundamental 
factor in life.
Buddhism can provide philosophical and practical elements referring to 
personal meaning and truth, as it is not stated what truth is, but at the same 
time it is the core of the teachings as a quality of experience. The 
development and refining of mindfulness, of how experience subjectively 
unfolds for the individual, is decisive for both approaches. Only through the 
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possibility of mindfully being with the moment-to-moment-perception, a 
freer way of dealing with experience in the here-and-now can mature, as 
well as a realisation of the hindrances to this freedom. For Buddhist practice 
in western societal environments the psychoanalytic approach is very 
helpful, because the starting point of all Buddhist practice is an 
understanding of the cultural and societal characteristics, which essentially 
mould the human mind (in a relative sense) also from a Buddhist point of 
view.
Buddhism—like all religious systems—is a cultural institution that 
cannot be analysed apart from its cultural surroundings and their particular 
histories. The overcoming of the limitations of the human mind, which are 
connected with these histories, is the aim of Buddhism. The way to arrive at 
this goal, however, is based on the possibility to reach humans in their 
actual circumstances, which refers back to an understanding of the specific 
situation and history.
Psychoanalysis, as a method that developed out of a confrontation with 
western religious and scientific history, provides elements that might lead to 
a clarification of the individual situation and choices within this situation. 
Both Buddhist psychology and psychoanalysis are thus indigenous 
psychologies, and the unfolding dialogue, based on their specific approaches 
to human experience and behaviour, points to further possibilities for 
exchange.
Buddhism as a Psychological System
141
Notes
1. The term ‘phenomenon’ in connection with Buddhism refers to 
Sanskrit dharma. Dharmas, used in this context, mean the individual 
components, which constitute in their wholeness the empirically 
perceivable world of humans. ‘Some of these elements (dharmas) are 
external to the perceiver and others are internal psychological 
processes and traits of character. It is in this context that the 
Madhyamaka school denied the substantial reality of dharmas, 
claiming that all phenomena were “empty”  (śūnya) of any substantial 
reality’ (Keown 2004, 74). Regarding the psychological significance 
of this term in the Madhyamaka school, see below.
2. The following, psychological explanations of the human Self should 
be qualified by considering that explanations with words in all 
approaches in Mahāyāna, and especially in Zen, are limited in how 
they can express the experience that underlies the scriptures; and from 
a hermeneutical perspective within psychology and psychotherapy it 
is exactly this experience that is most interesting. In Zen, this is 
uttered with four characteristics—a teaching outside of scriptures, not 
based on words and directly pointing to the human mind, which 
should lead to a realization of the own nature and Buddhahood (kyōge 
betsuden, furyū monji, jikishi jinshin, kenshō jōbutsu; see Welter 
2000). Buddhist insight always points to an individual wordless 
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experience and written conceptions of this experience are mainly aids, 
which do not include the whole spectrum of the experience (see 
Virtbauer 2008a).
3. Indra is a god from indo-aryan, vedic origins (the head of the vedic 
pantheon), who plays an essential role in Buddhist cosmology.
4. The name of this Mahāyāna-Buddhist stream (Madhyamaka) refers to 
a main question from a psychological perspective. One the one hand, 
Buddhism denies the existence of a Self as an inner human core or an 
eternal soul, but on the other hand also nihilistic thinking that would 
not go along with the Buddhist cause-and-effect-principle (the karma 
teaching). In the middle way, philosophy is done between these two 
extremes.
5. The descriptions, which are given here, refer to these patients.
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6	
 Conclusion: Buddhist psychology – present 
and future
[Klammertext]
The enormous interest in mindfulness theory and practice within 
western science, medicine, healthcare and education will continually 
bring new challenges and also new opportunities. Ancient and 
modern, Eastern and Western modes of inquiry and investigation are 
now in conversation and cross-fertilizing each other as never before. 
Indeed, we could say the field of mindfulness-based applications is in 
its infancy and there is great promise that it will continue to yield new 
insights and avenues for research as it develops in multiple directions. 
(Williams & Kabat-Zinn, 2011, p. 16)
Shortly after Chapter 2 of this cumulative thesis was accepted for 
publication a special issue of Contemporary Buddhism on ‘mindfulness’ 
appeared (see Williams & Kabat-Zinn, 2011). This issue is an important step 
towards interdisciplinary innovations in the research of mindfulness from 
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both so-called ‘first-person’ and ‘third-person’ perspectives. The 
characteristic of indigenous Indian psychology is that individual (first-
person) insight into qualities of human nature through certain practices is 
regarded as a scientific way of investigation (see Rao, 2008, and cf. Chapter 
3 on first-person experience in Buddhist and Western phenomenological 
psychology). Mainstream Western psychology operates within a clear 
subject-object distinction – a third-person perspective. The first-person 
approach in Buddhist psychology may play an important role in the 
continuous development of a holistic psychological science that can provide 
results of greater ecological validity and relevance. The fruitfulness of the 
meeting between theories and applications that are based on direct 
experiential knowledge, as is the case in Buddhist psychology, and their 
investigation through modern scientific methods can be seen in the current 
discourses that are tackled in the articles of this thesis. Buddhist psychology 
has established itself as an integrated part of Western psychology, 
particularly of the mentioned therapies, because its theories of the human 
mind and consciousness, which are based on first-person experience, and 
applications have proved to be effective from the perspective of third-person 
scientific investigation.
In regard to the three approaches that are introduced in this thesis (cf. 
Chapter 2), especially the discourses between science and Buddhism may be 
of relevance to future psychological innovations. Will Buddhism help to 
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foster a postmodern scientific Enlightenment movement that focuses on the 
development of new ways of understanding human nature within a broader 
context of cause and effect? Will such a movement be a transformative 
answer to scientific materialist reductionism and lead to a deeper 
understanding of the lifeworld through mutual interdependence and 
intersubjectivity? Will it be possible to establish a scientific psychological 
understanding that acknowledges the interdependence of individual and 
collective developments, as is expounded in Buddhist phenomenological 
psychology? Will it provide workable solutions to pressing current global 
questions? Will science become a more ethical endeavour because of 
Buddhist influences? How will science continue to globally transform 
Buddhism?
These are some of the questions of relevance to future research to which 
the current discourses point. In contemporary contributions there is growing 
sensitivity to the transformative processes in the reception of Eastern 
thought in Western science. Intercultural psychological sensitivity is crucial 
for the continuous dialogue and critical examination of the cultural 
presuppositions that manifest in the involved systems (see Dorjee, 2010; 
Grossman & Van Dam, 2011).
The dialogue between Buddhist and Western psychology unfolds in the 
broader context of postmodernism. It points to new understandings of the 
potential of human nature that go beyond the borders of disciplines, 
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systems, and certain cultural preconceptions of what it means to be human. 
It is about a deeper understanding of the very phenomena that constitute 
human nature. Such an absolute understanding can only manifest in the 
relative realm of the historical development of certain systems. However, 
from a Buddhist perspective it is considered to be possible to 
psychologically analyse how the absolute reveals itself through and in the 
relative, and vice versa (cf. Chapters 4 and 5). To include such an 
understanding of reality into the systemic framework of science appears to 
be a possible, and from the perspective of this work desired, future 
consequence of the current discourses. Within Western scientific psychology 
a ‘future contemplative science’ (see Wallace, 1999) that focuses on 
phenomenological psychological questions through a practice-oriented and 
first-person experiential methodology may grow. It may be characterised by 
interdisciplinarity and cooperation with various scientific disciplines and 
societal institutions. The increasing influence of Mindfulness-Based 
Interventions (MBIs) at different levels of Western society (see Williams & 
Penman, 2011) may be a step towards such a contemplative science. 
Mindfulness appears to be the crucial psychological transformative power 
for future epistemological innovations in postmodern science that are 
necessary for a new understanding of the means and ends of science as a 
dominant constituting factor of the lifeworld.
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 Abstracts
The cumulative thesis Buddhism as a psychological system: Western 
reception, contemporary dialogues, and perspectives, which includes four 
articles, an introduction, and a conclusion, outlines fundamentals within 
three approaches of receiving Buddhism as a psychological system: 
Buddhism as an indigenous psychology; parts of the system Buddhism 
integrated in Western psychology and psychotherapy; and new movements 
in Western Buddhism that are in critical dialogue with contemporary 
scientific methodologies and findings. The article The Western reception of 
Buddhism as a psychological and ethical system: developments, dialogues, 
and perspectives provides a concise overview of the current research within 
these three approaches, with a special focus on philosophy of science and 
perspectives based on epistemological considerations. In connection with 
the introduction and the conclusion, it serves as an exploration of the 
research and practice field [the ‘Klammertext’], on which analyses in the 
following articles are grounded. Experiencing sati: a phenomenological 
survey of mindfulness in Buddhist psychology explores the concept of 
mindfulness from the perspective of Buddhist phenomenology. Mindfulness 
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is the central Buddhist idea concerning the reception of Buddhist 
psychology in current psychotherapy. Bewusstsein und Beziehung im 
Mahāyāna-Buddhismus: Ein integrativ religionspsychologischer Ansatz 
tackles epistemological concepts, which directly and indirectly are present 
as soon as experience and behaviour are addressed from a Buddhist 
viewpoint. Thus, this piece is an example of approaching (Mahāyāna-)
Buddhism as an indigenous psychology. How critical terms in different 
systems – in this case, ‘intersubjectivity’ – can create spaces for dialogue is 
explored in Dimensions of intersubjectivity in Mahāyāna-Buddhism and 
relational psychoanalysis. Crucial points are the consideration of the 
cultural backgrounds, as well as the different connotations and utilisations 
of terms in distinct world views and languages. The dialogue between 
relational psychoanalysis and Buddhism is one example of how postmodern 
ideas, such as interdisciplinary work and epistemological humility, can 
manifest in practice, with contemporarily recognisable impacts on both 
dialogue partners.
Die kumulative Dissertation Buddhism as a psychological system: Western 
reception, contemporary dialogues, and perspectives, die sich aus vier 
Artikeln, einer Einleitung und abschließenden Bemerkungen 
zusammensetzt, adressiert die Rezeption des Buddhismus als 
psychologischem Systems im Zusammenhang mit drei Zugängen: 
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Buddhismus als indigene Psychologie; Teile des Systems Buddhismus 
integriert in westlicher Psychologie und Psychotherapie; und neue 
Ausformungen innerhalb des westlichen Buddhismus, die kritisch 
wissenschaftliche Erkenntnisse und Methodologien reflektieren und 
teilweise inkorporieren. Der Artikel The Western reception of Buddhism as a 
psychological and ethical system: developments, dialogues, and 
perspectives gibt einen Überblick der gegenwärtigen Forschung in Bezug 
auf diese drei Zugänge und zeigt neue Perspektiven, die sich aufgrund der 
Buddhismusrezeption im Westen aufzeigen. Der Schwerpunkt liegt auf 
wissenschaftstheoretischen und epistemologischen Fragestellungen. 
Zusammen mit der Einleitung und den Perspektiven in den abschließenden 
Bemerkungen fungiert er als Klammertext, der das breitere Forschungs- und 
Praxisfeld des Dialoges zwischen Buddhismus und Psychologie und 
Psychotherapie darlegt. Experiencing sati: a phenomenological survey of 
mindfulness in Buddhist psychology führt in das buddhistische Konzept der 
Achtsamkeit und dessen Praxis ein. Dieses ist für die gegenwärtige 
Psychotherapie von herausragender Bedeutung. In Bewusstsein und 
Beziehung im Mahāyāna-Buddhismus: Ein integrativ 
religionspsychologischer Ansatz werden epistemologische Konzepte im 
Buddhismus analysiert, die – direkt und indirekt – immer präsent sind, 
sobald menschliches Erleben und Verhalten aus buddhistischer Perspektive 
analysiert werden. Der Artikel ist ein Beispiel einer Auseinandersetzung mit 
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dem (Mahāyāna-)Buddhismus als indigener Psychologie. Neue 
Dialogperspektiven anhand von Schlüsselbegriffen in den Systemen – in 
diesem Fall der Terminus ‚Intersubjektivität’ – werden in Dimensions of 
intersubjectivity in Mahāyāna-Buddhism and relational psychoanalysis 
aufgezeigt. Im Vordergrund stehen kulturelle Unterschiede, die sich in der 
Verwendung und den Konnotationen von Begriffen in verschiedenen 
Weltanschauungen und Sprachen manifestieren. Der Dialog zwischen 
relationaler Psychoanalyse und Buddhismus ist ein Beispiel von praktischer 
Umsetzung postmoderner Ideen. Aus der interdisziplinären Begegnung 
resultieren neue Möglichkeiten für beide Dialogpartner, Ansätze in den 
eigenen Systemen zu reflektieren und weiterzuentwickeln.
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 Transliteration and pronunciation of 
Sanskrit and Pāli
Devanāgarī (!वनागरी, ‘divine city writing’)
is one of the scripts in which Indo-Aryan languages such as Sanskrit and 
Pāli are commonly written and printed in India. It is the crucial script for the 
Sanskrit syllabary. The columns provide the devanāgarī letter, the scientific 
Roman transliteration, which is used in this work, as well as an example of 
how the letter is roughly pronounced. The pronunciation examples are from 
M. L. Gharote (2008). The Glossary of Yoga Texts. Lonavla: The Lonavla 
Yoga Institute (India). pp. 10–11; A.K. Warder (1991). Introduction to Pali 
(3rd ed.). Oxford: Pali Text Society. pp. 3–4; and Swami Yogakanti, & Bihar 
School of Yoga (2007). Sanskrit Glossary of Yogic Terms. Munger, Bihar, 
India: Yoga Publications Trust. p. viii. The emphases are mine.
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अ a cup
आ, ा ā far
इ, ि i hill
ई, ी ī feel
उ, ु u pull
ऊ, ू ū wool
ऋ, ृ * ṛ clarity
ॠ, ॄ * ṝ marine
ऌ, ॢ * ḷ rivalry
ॡ, ॣ * ḹ rivalry (prolonged)
ए, े e grey (Pāli bed, 
before a double 
consonant)
ऐ, ै * ai aisle (not drawled 
out)
ओ, ो o over (Pāli not, before 
a double consonant)
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औ, ौ * au ounce (not drawled 
out)
ं ṃ map/nap, Pāli also 
sing
ः * ḥ ah
क्् k king
ख्् kh inkhorn
ग्् g go
घ्् gh yoghurt
G ṅ sing
च्् c check
छ्् ch churchhill
ज्् j joy
झ्् jh hedgehog
ञ्् ñ canyon
ट्् ṭ ton
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ठ्् ṭh anthill
ड्् ḍ dog
ढ्् ḍh redhead
ण्् ṇ and
त्् t water (dental)
थ्् th thumb
द्् d then
ध्् dh adhere (more dental)
न्् n not
प्् p paw
फ्् ph top-heavy or photo
ब्् b rub
भ्् bh hob-house
म्् m mat
य्् y yoga
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र्् r red
ल्् l love
ळ् ** ḷ l (retroflex)
^ह` ** ḷh l-h (retroflex 
aspirated)
व्् v svelte
श्् * ś ashes
ष्् * ṣ assure
स्् s sun
ह` h hum
d ्* kṣ rickshaw
e् * jñ gnu
* Letter or conjunct does not appear in Pāli.
** In Vedic Sanskrit and Pāli.
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